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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examines the decision making process in Washington which led to the current non-
existence of political and economic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. 
The study examines the U.S.-Iran relationship at three levels-of-analysis: the individual, state, and 
system levels.  
 
From a geopolitical perspective, Iran and the United States have often been natural allies that 
pursued similar policy goals. After 9/11, the U.S. entered Afghanistan and Iraq which further 
necessitated the reengagement of Tehran. Iranian regional clout would play a vital role in stabilization of 
Iraq and Afghanistan and without Iran’s assistance; peace will not likely be realized in those states. 
Amongst the most compelling reasons for Washington to engage in meaningful dialogue with Tehran 
are: terrorism, the war on drugs, the Iranian sponsorship of militant groups, and Tehran’s pursuit of a 
nuclear program. 
 
The study concludes that rapprochement should occur in two phases. The first being cooperation 
in areas of mutual concern such as the war on drugs. The second phase promoting confidence building 
methods, which would lead to a strategic partnership based on mutual interests.  
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 CHAPTER 1: MAIN ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
In the post-Cold War milieu, the United States has emerged as a global superpower with the 
ability to impose its will globally with a modicum of impunity. Unfortunately, Washington has 
occasionally prosecuted foreign policy undemocratically in that its endeavors are counter to the 
democratic consensus of the international community. I shall examine Washington’s policy of 
containment towards Iran and uncover how it is wholly inappropriate and a detriment to America’s 
political effectiveness abroad; not only in Afghanistan and the broader Middle East but with its 
European allies as well. This examination of Washington’s policies towards Iran will elucidate their 
negative impact upon America’s endeavors, specifically within the surrounding regions. What I hope to 
communicate clearly is that America’s current foreign policy towards Iran is indeed inappropriate and 
how adjustments in Washington’s foreign policies toward Iran could enable the U.S. to realize a myriad 
of important goals within the region. Washington cannot afford to ignore Iran or continue its policy of 
containment towards it. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a country that is a shimmering geopolitical 
jewel. Strategically situated on the Persian Gulf, Iran is one of the world's biggest oil producers through 
which most Middle Eastern oil flows into international markets. Washington’s obstinacy has had the 
effect of pushing Iran into a Sino-Russo orbit. As a result, China and Russia have successfully 
maneuvered for influence in a post-Khomeini Iran and have been steadily negotiating for Iranian oil and 
gas.1 
The tragedy of the current impasse in U.S. – Iranian relations is that despite a half a century of 
intrigue and acrimony, the Iranian populace strongly admires American values, ingenuity and industrial 
prowess.2 In his book, The Eagle and the Lion, Iran scholar James A. Bill made note of a previous 100-
year period of positive U.S.-Iranian relations. In the early 1800’s American medical and teaching 
missionaries traveled to Iran to provide educational support. He also details how Washington stood 
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beside Iran during its campaign in the mid-1940’s to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw its military 
presence stationed there during World War II. Iran had once looked favorably upon the U.S. as an ally 
and a role model for the struggle against colonialism. Yet the following three decades occasioned a 
dramatic shift in opinion resulting in the perception of the United States as an imperialist force. 
Washington depended predominantly upon the brutal Shah Pahlavi’s assessments while neglecting overt 
signs of civil unrest leading up to open rebellion. Sadly, the level of hatred for the U.S. unleashed by the 
Khomeini revolution caught many in Washington completely by surprise.3 
However, the Iranian revolution, the establishment of an Islamic Republic, the seizure of the 
U.S. embassy in Tehran, and the current state of affairs between Tehran and the Washington are all 
outgrowths of a history of unjust foreign interference and manipulation of Iran by Washington. 
Although Iran faces significant regional challenges, the United States stands as Iran’s foremost strategic 
challenge. Its relations with Washington have been further exacerbated in recent times with the Bush 
Administration routinely calling for yet another U.S. orchestrated “regime change” in Tehran. The 
massive projection of American military might on the Iranian frontiers since September 11 has added 
credence to Iran’s claims of being beset on all sides by the United States.4 Despite its comedy of errors 
in the Middle East Washington remains intensely involved in Middle Eastern affairs, seeking to 
maintain its hegemonic influence and impose its will by force if necessary. As once stated by Michael 
Hudson, a professor at the school of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “the United States 
stands astride this unhappy region like a colossus; the dominant power over the Middle East.”5 
Although the United States has legitimate reasons for involving itself in Middle Eastern affairs, 
namely in the realm of energy exploitation, it has also questionably involved itself in matters ranging 
from the projection of military might to regime change. Due to its hasty invasion and occupation of Iraq, 
Washington has landed itself in the role of a foreign sovereign with all the duties and obligations 
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attached to that office. Between Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington’s expanding role has also created an 
uncomfortable fence of American influence around Iran that has understandably alarmed Tehran. 
Certainly Washington would be equally alarmed if Iran penetrated Canada and Mexico economically 
and politically while also patrolling the international waters of the coasts of U.S. littoral states. Regional 
instability, challenges with energy exploitation endeavors, and soured U.S./Iran relations can certainly 
be remedied by an adjustment in Washington’s policy towards Iran. It is axiomatic that U.S. 
rapprochement with Iran would effect broad changes in the current political landscape and open 
profitable avenues for energy exploitation. From the stabilization of Afghanistan and the volatile Persian 
Gulf region to diminishing Sunni militancy, the United States and Iran at times find themselves uneasily 
on the same side. Should the two antagonists ever manage to dismantle the “wall of mistrust” separating 
the two governments, they would take a giant step toward creating a new and more stable Middle East.6 
Recent talks between Washington and Tehran established through Swiss intermediaries reveal that 
pragmatism might possibly overcome ideology and end the protracted period of soured relations. 
Switzerland has looked after U.S. interests in Tehran in the absence of formal diplomatic relations 
between Tehran and Washington, which were severed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.7 However 
events unfold, Washington officials are surely attuned with the positive benefits associated with 
normalized relations with Iran. In the words of G. John Ikenberry, Political Science professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania, “America is not adrift in uncharted seas: it is at the center of a world of its 
own making.”8 
This piece is not a suggestion that Washington should make any concessions that are of a 
detriment to American national security interests, domestically or abroad. It is equally not a suggestion 
that the Islamic government in Iran does not have major changes to make with regard to its internal and 
external practices. However, it does suggest that Washington must assume a leading role on the world 
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stage by taking the initiative to end the current diplomatic chill between Iran and the United States. 
There are adjustments that could be made in American foreign policy towards Iran which could 
conceivably occasion moderation in Tehran. This is a notion recently underscored by Representative 
Gary L. Ackerman in his statement before the Congressional Subcommittee on the Middle East and 
South Asia: 
“We are in Iraq largely because we, as a nation, didn’t think. We can’t afford to make the same 
mistake twice. To face the challenge from Iran we must start by learning and questioning. What are Iran’s 
strategic aspirations? Who controls Iran’s foreign policy? Are there schisms and weaknesses in Iran’s 
political system that we can exploit? How do Iran’s leaders see their country’s place in the world, and 
what does that imply about our ability to affect its foreign policy choices? What’s behind the rhetoric—
especially the threats to Israel and the repellent Holocaust denial? Who controls the balance between 
ideology and realpolitik in Iranian security policy?” 
In his closing sentence, Representative Ackerman quoted American diplomat and deputy head of 
the U.S. mission in Moscow in the mid 1940’s. This statement stands as timeless advice, completely 
relevant to the suggestions in this policy piece as they apply to Washington’s current endeavors in the 
Middle East: 
“We must have the courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of 
human society. . . . The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem . . . is that we shall 
allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”9 
 
Iran and the U.S. – Revolutionary Cousins 
A salient reality confronts all those who endeavor to examine the similarities between Iran and 
the United States. In the course of doing so, one discovers the two could be considered revolutionary 
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cousins; mutineer leaves from the same tree of insurrection. Clearly Iran and the U.S. are at different 
developmental stages. However a comparison can be made making general observations during the 
course of their developmental stages. Both similarly rebelled and successfully threw off what they 
perceived to be injudicious foreign manipulation. During their nascent independence, both countries 
were characterized by secular nationalism. It was only after the Iranian revolution that religious forces 
subsequently took control of Iran. It is also an inaccurate notion that regnant Anti-American sentiment in 
Iran was fomented solely on the basis of Islamic dogma. Anti-Americanism was also trenchant among 
the secular middle and upper classes who harbored no particular fondness of the Iranian clerics. 
Surprisingly, anti-American sentiment was also prevalent among many devout Iranians who ironically 
opposed the clerical leadership of Iran. Much like the United States, although guided by different 
cultural and religious structures, the Iranian revolution was the manifestation of a frustrated and 
demoralized population. Akin to the American colonists, the Iranians rebelled against a repressive 
government that allowed its citizens no influence in policies that affected them directly; or access to 
viable avenues for redress of grievances.10  
During the course of the revolution, as well as in its wake, Khomeini rose to prominence as 
George Washington and Abraham Lincoln did in the early phases of the American republic. In America 
Washington emerged as the fearless warrior who liberated the nation from tyranny, establishing 
democratic institutions for posterity. His legacy was also that of isolationism – an America for 
Americans. Lincoln safeguarded the integrity of the American nation-state by cleansing the country of 
improper practices, such as the subjugation of human beings for profit. In doing so Lincoln became an 
immutable historical figure as it applies to the American scheme of freedom. Lincoln additionally 
demonstrated a profound willingness to prosecute war in the defense of American ideals. Both figures 
remain indelible models for American leadership whose mythic qualities have been routinely mimicked 
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by political figures across American history.11 Like Washington and Lincoln, Khomeini emerged as 
strikingly different type of Iranian leader; a key figurehead in Iranian history. Stoic and inflexible, 
Khomeini had powerful convictions and soaring confidence in his spiritual stature. His noteworthy 
brilliance and clear sense of destiny, not only for himself but for Iran, enabled him to command respect 
from his countrymen. Khomeini harnessed the power of Shi’a lore and imagery, which enabled him to 
seize control of Iran and lay claim to its very soul. Much like the framers did with American democracy 
and the rule of law, Khomeini made Islamic fundamentalism a political force that would change Muslim 
politics from Morocco to Malaysia. Similarly, Khomeini only became a revolutionary figure in reaction 
to external policies that had, in his mind, negative effects within Iran. Both America and Iran also share 
the misfortune of having been victims of European commercial and political pressures. The tentacles of 
colonialist influence threatened both counties by subjugating them economically and denying them a 
well-founded sense of political efficacy. Both Iranian and early Americans revolutionaries battled for 
their independence with their endeavors bulwarked by charismatic ideologues who rose in defense of 
certain inalienable rights and, above all, their national interests.12 
Finally, both America and Iran have not hesitated to provide funding and material support during 
the course of endeavors to export their respective revolutionary ideals. This practice has predominantly 
been driven by a desire to expand their sphere of ideological influence not only regionally but abroad as 
well. Washington has routinely lambasted Tehran for its material support of Islamic organizations such 
as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Despite their negative images, it is undeniable 
that these Islamic organizations are regionally reactionary and outgrowths of what is perceived to be 
foreign interference. In essence, Tehran’s ideological and material support of revolutionary groups is no 
different than that of Washington’s in reaction to Communism’s influence and perceived Soviet 
penetration into Latin America.   
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In Guatemala’s 1950 democratic elections, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected to power with 
65% of the popular vote. Arbenz was a reformer who made it no secret that he intended to improve 
living conditions for the nation’s destitute majority.  Arbenz was ultimately perceived as a threat by the 
Eisenhower Administration due to his proposed leftist social reforms.  In the United States McCarthyism 
had fomented an intense anti-Communism hysteria and this did not bode well for Arbenz who allowed 
the local Communist Party to operate openly. Despite the positive benefits for his country’s poor 
citizenry, Arbenz’s land reform program represented a looming threat to the commercial interests of an 
American-based multinational corporation, the United Fruit Company (UFC).  The UFC was 
Guatemala's largest landowner and a majority of its holdings were vulnerable to Arbenz's reform plans. 
During the course of calculating its tax obligations, the UFC had purposefully undervalued the worth of 
its holdings by claiming its land holdings were only worth $3 per acre. When, during the course of the 
land reform initiative, the Arbenz government offered to compensate the UFC at the declared rate the 
UFC argued the land's true value was $75 per acre, unable to explain the precipitous jump in its own 
determination of the land's value. The UFC’s close ties to the U.S. government and Arbenz’s potential 
communist ties ultimately enabled the UFC to appeal successfully to the Eisenhower Whitehouse. In the 
years following Arbenz’s election, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained and sponsored a 
Guatemalan military force to remove him from power.  The U.S. sponsored operation succeeded in mid-
1954, deposing the democratic government and replacing it with a military junta. The CIA coup ushered 
in an era of torture, repression, and state terrorism that took the lives of close to two hundred thousand 
Guatemalans. In 1960 the new government authorized the CIA to operate in Guatemala to train Cuban 
exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. Additionally, State terror escalated to genocide in the 1980s 
as entire Mayan communities were wiped out with the active connivance of the Reagan Administration, 
according to the findings in 1999 of a United Nations sponsored truth commission.13 Due to the U.S. 
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sponsored manipulation of Guatemala the country has never been the same. Its milieu of internecine 
conflict has been further exacerbated by numerous natural disasters in the region. Currently, Guatemala 
is characterized by a small ruling aristocracy, which possesses a majority of the country’s wealth while 
its poor populace labors for survival. By no stretch of imagination, it is evident that U.S. government 
officials sponsored terrorism in Guatemala by virtue of the provision of arms, training, diplomatic cover, 
and intelligence. 
In 1979 a left-wing revolutionary group, called the Sandinistas, toppled the Somoza dictatorship 
in Nicaragua. The group was named after a Nicaraguan revolutionary leader – Augusto Cesár Sandino. 
Soon after taking office in 1981, President Ronald Reagan authorized the CIA to secretly fund and equip 
the Contras. The Contras were mostly former members of the Somoza military who sought the 
overthrow of the Sandinista government and operated from bases in Honduras and Costa Rica. The 
Reagan Administration intervened on the basis of confronting “the Cuban presence and 
Cuban-Sandinista support structure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.” The CIA’s 
controversial actions in South America, which included the mining of Nicaragua's harbors in the mid 
1980’s, resulted in the promulgation of the Boland amendment. This congressional law prohibited the 
sponsorship of military operations in Nicaragua, a practice commonly engaged in by U.S. Intelligence 
agencies. Despite the unlawful nature of supporting the Contra rebels, President Reagan gave orders to 
preserve the integrity of Contra resistance, “body and soul.” It was then that the National Security 
Council (NSC) assumed operational control; an endeavor previously orchestrated by the CIA. Although 
the activities were proscribed, President Reagan and U.S. officials continued to ensure that aid flowed to 
the Contras; the bulk emanating from private sources and third party states such as Brunei, South Africa, 
and Saudi Arabia. The clandestine operation was bulwarked by air support, secure communications, and 
Swiss bank accounts. Operating under the code name “the Enterprise”, this illegal organization was 
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overseen by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North who was at the time an aide to the National 
Security Council. The operation was conducted with the tacit approval of Colonel North’s superiors, 
National Security Advisers Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, and CIA director William Casey.  
Comprised of business people and former intelligence and military officials, this apparatus operated in 
secret and outside the realm of congressional oversight. In order to garner sympathy for the Contras, 
who were purportedly on their heels due to the congressional cutoff, the Reagan Administration also 
engaged in illicit propaganda campaigns in hopes of swaying congressional votes in favor of 
intervention.14 The actions of the Reagan Administration became publicly known in November 1986. 
Investigations by a presidentially appointed panel and a joint committee of Congress focused on whether 
or not Reagan knew about or had authorized the diversion, and whether Congress's constitutional foreign 
policy and budget prerogatives as well as U.S. laws had been violated. An independent counsel 
investigated the legality of third-country fund-raising for projects banned by Congress, as well as the 
obstruction of justice by administration officials. It was ultimately determined there had been “secrecy, 
deception, and disdain for the law,” but that President Reagan had not broken the law. Nearly a dozen 
senior administration officials and private citizens were convicted of crimes. However all convicted U.S. 
officials, as well as those awaiting trial, were pardoned in December 1992 by President George H. Bush. 
Much like the CIA-organized invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961, the American fingerprint in 
Nicaragua left an indelible stain on American credibility. Officials at the highest level had been exposed 
for organizing international terrorism, violating U.S. law, and lying under oath. Sadly, the central figures 
in the controversy later enjoyed high-profile careers in both the public and private sectors.15 
During the course of American intervention in South America, presidential administrations have 
gone so far as to portray the enabled elements as “freedom fighters.” In most cases, the so-called 
“freedom fighters” engaged in wide-scale atrocities against the civilian population with the tacit 
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approval of Washington. When examined objectively, the freedom fighters are analogous to terrorists 
who are far worse than the elements they seek to displace. When successful, such as in Guatemala, the 
enabled parties establish repressive dictatorships that enjoy Washington’s largesse as long as private 
elements or certain governmental agencies are given free reign to operate within their borders. 
Ironically, for engaging in the same practice, Tehran has been characterized by Washington as a 
“sponsor of terrorism”. 
This objective comparison reveals that much like American foreign policy, Iranian sponsorship 
of external revolutionary elements has been wholly reactionary. The notion of appropriateness is not as 
relevant to this argument as the rationale for the sponsorship. It is the penetration and expansion of 
unfavorable ideological elements, which is the basis for the sponsorship of rebel proxies. As 
revolutionary cousins, Iran and the United States are no strangers to the notion of aiding rebel 
movements in their struggles against threats that are ideological in nature. However it is a practice that 
has also encumbered them with the yoke of escalating commitments, ultimately entangling both Tehran 
and Washington in labyrinthine regional imbroglios. 
 
Thesis Methodology 
This paper will justify the necessity for U.S. / Iranian rapprochement via a “Waltzian” 
examination of relations at the individual, state and system levels. A well known scholar in the field of 
political science, Kenneth Waltz posited the notion of categorizing theories of international relations into 
three “images”, or “levels of analysis”. In his book, “Man, the State, and War”, the procedure stresses 
the significance of each image during the examination of global politics. The first image, or individual 
level, deals with human nature, which Waltz suggests has great bearing upon the nature of relations 
between states. The second image, or state level, is analogous to the first in that Waltz suggests that 
 11
defects in states cause war among them. The third image, or system level, characterizes the international 
system as anarchical due to the lack of a supreme governing body. According to Waltz, conflict can 
occur because there no overall authority designated to prevent it.16 
Although weak in theory and optimistic, this paper is primarily a policy piece that examines the 
issues from a cost benefit analysis perspective. During the course of objective examination and rational 
argumentation this paper will elucidate how Washington has failed to fully capitalize on many avenues 
for rapprochement and how simple adjustments in American foreign policy would still substantially 
benefit both actors. This researcher not only relied upon scholarly research but also research abroad. The 
rationale for the suggested American foreign policy change will be additionally supported by personal 
experiences and interviews of Iranian citizens conducted during the course of field research within the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.   
 
Individual Level Introduction 
The relations between leaders (individual level) have been the primary stumbling block to 
normalized relations with Iran. Washington’s failures in this area emanate primarily from ideological 
misunderstandings coupled with a failure to capitalize upon subtle hints aimed at the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. Like the United States, Iran is a country characterized by pride and defiance; 
governed by competing centers of power. Its elected elements such as the President and its parliament 
(the Majles) are subordinate to appointed clerical leadership; the Supreme Council lead by the Supreme 
Leader (Grand Ayatollah). The Supreme Leader constitutionally controls the Iranian armed forces and 
crafts Iranian foreign policy. Iran’s theocratic political culture causes power and influence in Iran to 
remain in a constant state of flux. For this reason, presidential administrations have routinely found Iran 
quite difficult to comprehend. Whether or not it may be the case, Washington’s understanding of Iran 
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has routinely appeared somewhat rudimentary. Additionally, the absence of economic ties and 
diplomatic relations for over 25 years has fomented apprehension on both sides with regard to the 
other’s motives. Simply stated, Washington and Tehran have become increasingly alien to one another 
and their lack of engagement has occasioned growing state of a misperception and unnecessary bellicose 
rhetoric from both sides.  
In his book, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, the perspective of Robert 
Jervis underscores the previous paragraph. Jervis examines the psychology of leaders and hazards of 
foreign policymaking in an environment characterized by cognitive bias, inadequate information, and 
stressful conditions. For Jervis, misperception commonly emanates from the failure of one actor to 
realize their capacity to provoke a hostile reaction from the other. Application of Jervis’ philosophy to 
this situation would suggest that Washington misreads Iran’s penetration into its neighboring states as 
hostile rather than what might possibly have been part of its legitimate and longstanding diplomatic 
interaction with neighboring elements. As a result, Washington continues to operate under cognitive 
biases which compel its leaders to value certain types of information more than others, even if from an 
unreliable source.17 If this current diplomatic chill is in fact caused by misperception, it is self evident 
that a policy change on the part of either actor would serve to re-establish productive diplomatic 
relations. Examination of the matter at the individual level will reveal Washington could break the cycle 
of hostility by taking the initiative to engage Iran directly. In doing so Washington could conceivably 
acquire Tehran’s commitment to constructive policies toward important regional issues; namely 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  
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State Level Introduction 
Examination of the issue at the state level focuses upon how Islamic terrorism is viewed by both 
countries. The alleged exportation of Iranian revolutionary ideals as well as Iranian nuclear development 
are also analyzed as state level issues. It is evident that criticism of Teheran from Washington centers 
upon its alleged sponsorship of terrorism, its supposed endeavor to expand itself ideologically across the 
region, and its nuclear program. Though the international community is not unjustified in being alarmed 
with regard to these matters, Washington has clearly demonstrated double standards within the region as 
it applies to counterterrorism, ideological exportation, and nonproliferation. The chapter notes that from 
the outset of the U.S. led war on terror how Iran overtly demonstrated its willingness to confront radical 
regional elements. The confrontation of radicalism in this region is an endeavor where both sides are 
natural allies. The argument highlights Iranian antipathy towards al-Qaeda and how Tehran welcomed 
the notion of the U.S. military putting al-Qaeda elements to rout in Afghanistan. It is axiomatic that al-
Qaeda is ideologically at odds with Iran on this basis of its Shi’a Islam, which al-Qaeda figureheads and 
its Sunni base perceive as heretical. Also examined is Washington’s enmity towards Iran with regard to 
its alleged subversion and terrorism beyond its borders by virtue of the exportation of its revolutionary 
ideology. In the wake of its Islamic revolution, Iran evidently sought to expand itself ideologically 
however this endeavor proved to be ephemeral. Domestic and external threats soon commanded the 
attention of Iran’s leaders. Homogeneity also represents a road block to Iranian ideological expansion. 
Shi’a Iran is culturally and religiously distinct from the majority of the Middle East, where Sunni Arabs 
are regionally hegemonic. For this reason, the inseparable elements of Shi’a Islam within the Iranian 
theocratic model will always deter Middle Eastern states and countries abroad from attempting to 
emulate its Islamic revolution. Examination of Iranian sponsorship will reveal that Washington’s 
rhetoric with regard to hostile Iranian machinations in the Middle East and beyond is without merit. The 
chapter ends with examination of the Iranian nuclear issue, particularly Washington’s current hysteria 
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with regard to Tehran’s legitimate nuclear intentions. These fears are evidently ignorant to the reality 
that, from the Eisenhower Administration through the Carter years, the U.S. was a major benefactor in 
the constitution of Iran’s nuclear program with the United States and Iran entering into a civil nuclear 
cooperation agreement in 1957. Over the following 20 years, that agreement was followed by technical 
assistance as well as an experimental nuclear reactor with enriched uranium and plutonium with fissile 
isotopes. Examination of this matter will elucidate Washington’s double standards and unwarranted 
obsession with the supposed nuclear intentions of an adversary while at the same time turning a blind 
eye to the proven nuclear arsenals of Israel, Pakistan, and India. Pakistan and Israel both possess nuclear 
weapons and sophisticated delivery systems with Israel capable of striking against Iran with its long-
range nuclear missiles in a matter of minutes. Unlike Iran, neither Israel nor Pakistan have participated 
as signatory powers to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ironically, both are in violation of UN 
Security Council resolutions regarding their nuclear weapons programs yet Washington does not hold 
the same alarmist view towards countries that are actually in defiance of UN Security Council 
resolutions.18 
 
System Level Introduction 
During the course of system level analysis, this paper will examine instances where Washington 
and Tehran’s interests converge; specifically in Afghanistan, Iraq and the war on drugs. Suggested is a 
direct dialogue with Iran specifically regarding Afghanistan and Iraq for the purpose of regional 
stabilization. Iranian involvement would greatly enhance the process of consolidating authority within 
the central governments of both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the rebuilding of their respective 
economies. Engaging Tehran with a willingness to work diplomatically in areas of common interests 
would substantially enable Washington to curb Iranian domestic and regional policies that Washington 
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finds to be objectionable. By selectively engaging Iran on issues where U.S. and Iranian interests 
converge, Washington would inevitably establish a productive political dialogue with Iran. It will be 
demonstrated how an adjustment in American foreign policy would increase Washington’s efficacy by 
arming it with Iran’s cultural, political, and religious clout. In addition, such dialogue would likely 
enable both parties to resolve deep differences over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and involvement in 
regional conflicts. It will reveal that the continued containment of Iran only impedes regional stability, 
does nothing to stem the flow of opium, and strengthens the hand of extremists who encourage 
confrontation with American forces. In closing the chapter ends with examination of the Pasdaran; the 
most ideologically committed arm of the Islamic regime. It will be demonstrated that by lumping 
together all aspects of the Pasdaran under the generic cognomen of a “terrorist organization”, 
Washington has severely disadvantaged itself. In the case of the Pasdaran, Washington is dealing with 
an element of Iran whose hierarchy is characterized by a heterogeneous group of clerics, politicians and 
social climbers. The ascendancy of the Pasdaran, economically, militarily, and politically, should be 
widely perceived as a backlash against a failing American lead endeavor to contain Iran. Washington’s 
bellicose rhetoric, such as calls for regime change, has clearly occasioned a conservative re-
entrenchment and a new leadership that has systematically rolled back domestic freedoms and deepened 
its control over the Iranian populace. The Pasdaran’s tentacles are seemingly omnipresent yet despite its 
rigid ideological components, many Iranians have political and economic stakes in maintaining and 
defending the current regime. Suggested will be pragmatic methods in which the Pasdaran maybe be 
approached in order to compel a majority of its elements to side with the populace against the rigidity of 
the ruling regime. 
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CHAPTER 2: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EXAMINATION – RELATIONS BETWEEN 
LEADERS 
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was the Shah of Iran after the Soviet Union, a country that had 
invaded Iran during the course of World War II, pressured his father to abdicate in 1941. American 
administrations held the view that the Shah of Iran was one of Washington’s most dependable pro-West 
leaders in the Middle East. Positive congress with Tehran was a top priority among U.S. policymakers, 
who concurred on Iran's strategic significance and concerned themselves with events or matters that 
might destabilize Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's regime. In 1955 the Shah was one of the signatories 
of the Baghdad Pact which united the "northern tier" countries. The Baghdad Pact was a defensive 
organization for promoting shared political, military and economic goals. Founded by Turkey, Iraq, 
Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran the organization was similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Its main purpose was to deter communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. When Iraq 
ended its involvement in 1959, the organization was renamed to the “Central Treaty Organization”, or 
CENTO.19 Coupled with the Saud monarchy in Saudi Arabia, the Pahlavi regime in Iran was the 
linchpin in the United States "twin-pillar" policy in the Middle East—a policy that had brought both 
countries into prominence as being critical to Western interests prior to the Iranian revolution.20 
Ironically, U.S. and British efforts to assure Pahlavi’s hegemony and to modernize Iran ultimately 
contributed to his downfall. 
During his first year in office, Eisenhower authorized the CIA to deal with a problem in Iran that 
had begun during Truman’s presidency. In 1951, the Iranian parliament nationalized the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company, a British corporation that controlled the nation’s petroleum industry. The British 
retaliated with economic pressure that created havoc with Iran’s finances, but Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mossadeq refused to yield. Eisenhower worried about Mossadeq’s willingness to cooperate 
 17
with Iranian Communists; he also feared that Mossadeq would eventually undermine the power of Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, a staunch anti-Communist partner. In August 1953, the CIA helped 
overthrow Mossadeq’s government and restore the shah’s power. In the aftermath of this covert action, 
new arrangements gave U.S. corporations an equal share with the British in the Iranian oil industry.21 
Following the Eisenhower and Kennedy commitments to Shah Pahlavi and to the Saudis, the 
Johnson Administration had pressed the Iranian monarch to carry out reforms—land redistribution, 
greater freedoms and rights for women and rapid improvements in education. These programs, it was 
felt, had to accompany Iran’s rapid drive for industrialization and military strength. The only real 
tension between the two countries was the Shah's seemingly insatiable desire for a modern and larger 
military apparatus. His insistence on spending more of Iran's growing oil revenues on military 
armaments conflicted with U.S. policy goals of advocating Iranian economic development and reform as 
a check against internal upheaval or revolution. The Shah’s power was known to be autocratic and at 
times arbitrary, nevertheless the monarch was seen as personally stable and generally enlightened if, at 
times, solitary and somewhat insecure. The fact that he made all the major decisions himself—was 
emperor, de facto prime minister, and commander in chief of the armed forces, as well as 
knowledgeable and supportive of SAVAK’s internal security activities—was taken into account.22 At 
one time the Shah was in negotiations to purchase arms from the Soviet Union, however Washington 
cautioned him there would be an adverse U.S. reaction. Ultimately, the Shah acquiesced to diplomatic 
pressure assuring Washington that he would not purchase sophisticated military equipment from the 
Soviet Union. In May 1968 President Johnson approved a 6-year, $600 million military credit sales 
package for Iran. As the Johnson Administration drew to a close, an inter-agency review concluded that 
the United States should continue to plan on the basis of $100 million in annual U.S. military credits to 
Iran. Military cooperation with Iran would continue to be a very high priority.23 The overall strategic 
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value of Iran and the Shah to the United States was appreciated by every American administration from 
Eisenhower through Ford. President Nixon had gone farthest, encouraging the Shah to cast himself in 
the role of regional policeman. Because of Iran’s strategic significance, the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations allowed the Shah to acquire virtually unlimited quantities of any non-nuclear weapons 
in the American arsenal.24 
During the Arab oil embargos of 1967 and 1973 the Shah continued to export oil to the U.S., 
actually doubling its exports in 1974.25 From 1951 into the 1970’s, Iran recognized Israel as a state and 
the two ultimately became strategic partners. This partnership had four main components: Iranian 
assistance for the immigration operations for Jews from Iraq; Israeli-Iranian cooperation in the area of 
intelligence; agreements for military cooperation; and the supply of Iranian oil to Israel.26 
In the summer of 1967, Harold Wilson's Government announced the withdrawal of British forces 
from “East of Suez”, a promise honored in 1971.27 Prior to the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the perception 
of Iran as the main protector of Gulf security was reinforced by the American reluctance to fill the 
power vacuum left by Britain as a result of its decision to withdraw its forces from the area "East of 
Suez," including the Persian Gulf. Iran took Great Britain's place as the military power that guaranteed 
stability in the Persian Gulf.28 Rather than replace the British presence “East of Suez” to secure shipping 
lanes with a direct American presence, the United States chose to rely on local powers, primarily Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, to provide Persian Gulf security.  
Becoming the regional gendarme of the Middle East required a massive investment in modern 
military equipment and a substantial amount of American consultants to support the highly sophisticated 
equipment for Iran’s military, which was comprised of unskilled and under-educated personnel. A clash 
of cultures emerged and subsequently antagonized the general Iranian populace. Resentment over the 
amount of Iranian oil revenues flowing to the United States and European countries concurrently 
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fomented resentment against the West. Additionally, Pahlavi’s regime became increasingly and 
egregiously corrupt. To counter rising discontent, Shah Pahlavi unleashed his security forces (SAVAK) 
to seek out and halt the dissidents. Subsequently, serious human rights issues ensued that further 
alienated the Iranian regime from its own subjects.  
The election of Jimmy Carter as president of the United States in 1976 can be characterized as a 
turning point in U.S.-Iranian relations. Known for his vocal emphasis on the importance of human rights 
in international affairs, Carter made a plethora of demands upon the Shah, threatening to withhold 
military and social aid if he didn’t comply. Carter pressured the Shah to release "political prisoners," 
whose ranks included radical fundamentalists, communists and terrorists.29 Responding to Carter, the 
Pahlavi regime released hundreds of political prisoners.  The termination of dissident repression is said 
to have encouraged the Shah's opponents. Some have come to view this pressure on the Shah and 
Carter's unwillingness to allow Pahlavi’s to squelch radical dissent as the impetus for Pahlavi’s 
downfall. 
Revolution ensued in 1978, fueled by the acrimonious sermons and lectures of aged 
fundamentalist cleric Ruhollah Khomeini, one of the Grand Ayatollahs of Shi’ite Islam. Between 1962 
and 1963 Khomeini had spoken out against the shah's reduction of religious estates in a land-reform 
program and against the emancipation of women. His ensuing arrest sparked anti-government riots and 
after being imprisoned for a year Khomeini was forcibly exiled from Iran in November 1964.30 
Khomeini fomented rebellion from abroad, capitalizing on Pahlavi’s history of harsh repression and 
attempts to modernize Iran. When Pahlavi was unable to totally comply with the Carter Administration's 
and British demands, the Carter Administration ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to terminate $4 
million per year in funding to religious Mullahs. Subsequently they became outspoken and vehement 
opponents of the Shah. Despite his granting of free and democratic elections Pahlavi was unable to 
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prevent an extremely volatile environment in Iran. The lack of U.S. support, coupled with angry 
Mullahs, left Pahlavi in a precarious position. Shah Pahlavi capitulated early and, under the guise of 
going on vacation, fled into exile. The provisional government he left behind collapsed soon thereafter 
and Khomeini returned triumphantly to Tehran where he was greeted by millions of Iranians filling the 
streets.31 
 
Shah Ruhollah Khomeini 
President Carter’s Term 
Trade between Iran and the United States prospered before the 1979 revolution. In 1978, 
American products accounted for $4 billion (approximately 21%) of all Iranian imports. The United 
States at that time was Iran's number-one trading partner.32 Following Khomeini’s return the Carter 
Administration scrambled to assure the new regime that the United States would maintain diplomatic ties 
with Iran.33 To symbolize support for Iran’s clerics, President Carter initially rejected a visa application 
for exiled Shah Pahlavi to travel to New York for medical treatment. In late October, shortly before the 
assault on the embassy, the head of the State Department's Iran Desk – Henry Precht – arrived in Tehran 
for a ten-day visit with intentions of improving and normalizing diplomatic relation between Washington 
and the new regime in Tehran.34 Around the same time frame Shah Pahlavi’s medical condition 
worsened. On October 22, President Carter changed his position and allowed Pahlavi to enter the United 
States explicitly for medical treatment. Pahlavi was admitted to the New York Hospital on October 23, 
1979 and the initial reaction to this was deceptively mild.35  On November 1, 1979, Iranian foreign 
minister Ibrahim Yazdi met with Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national security 
advisor, in Algiers to discuss resumption of relations. At the meeting, Brzezinski invited the new Iranian 
regime to enter into a strategic partnership with the United States. For the most part the offer was 
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enthusiastically received. However, Pahlavi’s entry to the United States was a catalyst for a strident wave 
of anti-American protest, which swiftly drowned out the tentative protests of Iran’s unemployed 
populace. Khomeini moved to harness the protesters anger over the Shah's entrance into the United States 
for medical treatment. On November 1, 1979 a communiqué from Khomeini was broadcast over the state 
controlled radio reminding Iranians that November 4th was the first anniversary of bloody anti-Shah 
demonstrations at the University of Tehran. Khomeini posited that in the absence of Pahlavi all of Iran’s 
problems emanated from the United States. Khomeini appealed to the student population to protest and to 
focus all their anger and energy against the United States and Israel in order to compel the United States 
to return the deposed Shah. It was clear that Khomeini was seeking to establish his authority over Iran's 
unruly student population. Iran’s younger population represented a large segment of the populace, which 
had been radicalized by the revolution. Yet it is uncertain whether he directly ordered the attack on the 
embassy or merely accommodated himself to a fait accompli engineered by overzealous followers.36 
Three days later, Iranian students attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking fifty-two diplomats 
hostage.37 In his book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis, David Houghton posits several 
possible causes such as radical ideology, the utilization of American hostages as bargaining chips for 
Shah Pahlavi, or to prevent Washington from engineering a counter-revolution. The circumstances 
suggest, as asserted by Houghton, the hostage-takers most likely sought to prevent another clandestine 
endeavor by the West to re-install Shah Pahlavi as a puppet dictator.38 
  After the hostage seizure, Khomeini was concerned about the possibility of the United States 
taking strong military and political action against his still fragile regime. Khomeini’s initial response to 
the takeover was to order that the students be chased off the grounds. However he reconsidered when he 
heard reports of its popularity.39 Rather than assuming a firm position, Khomeini played a double game 
for several days while carefully gauging Washington’s reaction. Khomeini’s late son Ahmad, who had 
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been asked to coordinate with those who raided the U.S. embassy, later conceded that Khomeini 
genuinely feared "thunder and lightning" from Washington. Conversely, Carter responded with a series 
of polite requests asking for the release of the American hostages on humanitarian grounds.40 
President Carter’s response involved the dispatching of Ramsey Clark and William Miller to 
Tehran; two historical opponents of America’s alliance with the Shah. With them came a letter signed 
by Carter that they were to personally deliver to Khomeini. It contained the assurance that the Shah 
would remain in the U.S. only for the duration of his illness, as well as an offer to procure access to the 
shah’s doctors for Iranian representatives. Second, Carter explicitly recognized the independence and 
territorial integrity of Iran and expressed his willingness to resume arms exports. Third, he politely 
asked Khomeini to have the hostages released. However Khomeini would not entertain diplomacy, 
refusing to allow President Carter’s emissaries to enter Iran. Washington responded by expelling Iranian 
diplomats as well as all Iranians in the U.S. illegally. This was also accompanied by the cessation of oil 
imports from Iran and the freezing of Iranian assets in U.S. banks. These actions failed to make the 
slightest impression. As the events unfolded, U.S. diplomats were paraded in front of TV cameras 
blindfolded and threatened with execution. For Khomeini it became increasingly evident there would be 
no military response from Washington. President Carter entered into protracted negotiations with Iranian 
President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and his minister of foreign affairs, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, via French 
mediators. Although both were high-profile Iranian politicos, they were virtually powerless figures in 
comparison to Khomeini. America had hoped to influence Iran by using the habitual mix of carrots and 
sticks, yet Khomeini was indifferent not only to all material incentives but also to the threat of violence.  
By the end of the first week of the drama Khomeini's view of America had changed. Once he had 
concluded that America would not take any meaningful action against his regime, Khomeini took over 
control of the hostage enterprise and used it to prop up his "anti-imperialist" credentials while 
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outflanking the Iranian left. The surprising show of weakness from Washington also encouraged the 
mullahs and the student hostage-takers. Matters worsened when a military mission to rescue the 
hostages ended in tragedy in the Iranian desert. In April 1980, Operation Eagle Claw, a top-secret 
mission to free the hostages, ended in disaster. From the outset of the mission, a helicopter developed 
engine trouble in a staging area of the Iranian desert. Eight Americans were killed as two planes collided 
during the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces. The force dispatched by Carter fled under the cover of 
night, leaving behind the charred bodies of eight of their comrades.41  
When the hostages were finally set free on January 20, 1981, this was thanks neither to 
international nor even just allied solidarity, nor, for that matter, to any particular American policy 
moves. The idea of providing positive incentives had failed just as much as the threat of armed 
intervention. The hostages were liberated in part because Tehran had grown weary of holding them. The 
liberation of the hostages was presented as a triumph by Khomeini being that they were only permitted 
to leave Iran on the day when Jimmy Carter left the White House.42 Some also present compelling 
evidence that in 1980, while Jimmy Carter was frantically negotiating for an early release of American 
hostages in Iran, members of the Ronald Reagan campaign staff had struck a pact with Khomeini. That 
deal was allegedly an offer he couldn't refuse—badly needed U.S. arms and spare parts for his war with 
Iraq if he kept the U.S. Embassy hostages in Tehran until after Election Day. Of course there were 
negotiations with the Carter Administration over the hostages. However the bargaining with Carter was 
primarily over money and offered the return of only $4 billion of the $12 billion in Iranian assets seized 
in U.S. banks. Carter’s offer involved no arms. There is also another compelling notion. Although 
Ayatollah Khomeini had thwarted Jimmy Carter at every turn, Carter's failed rescue attempt might look 
mild in comparison to what Ronald Reagan was likely to do in order to gain the release of the American 
hostages being held in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.43 
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Although the hostage taking incident remains a thorn in the side of most who would reject the 
notion of rapprochement with Iran, it must be noted that this incident was an inevitable outgrowth of 
injudicious American foreign policy towards Iran. The invasion itself was perpetrated by elements 
radicalized by the U.S. backed, heavy-handed Shah and the revolution. The bulk of the Iranian populace 
currently holds America in high regard and laments their plight under the hands of the current theocratic 
regime. Although the front of the American embassy in Tehran still remains covered with anti-American 
propaganda, that sentiment is not mirrored in the Iranian population. On several occasions during my 
visit to the Islamic republic Iranians pointed out the anti-American propaganda on the front of the closed 
American embassy with powerful disapproval. While driving past the U.S. embassy, a taxi cab driver 
expressed sadness over the embassy’s closure and indicated that he prayed for its reopening, the return 
of the Americans, and western influence in Iran. One of my guides, Parviz Rostaminezhad, commented 
that historical events, such as the embassy invasion, must not remain the basis of the seemingly 
impenetrable roadblock to rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. He noted that the American 
presence would be overwhelmingly welcomed by Iranians but unconditional diplomacy rather than 
threats and sanctions were the key to moderating Tehran.44  
 
President Reagan’s Term 
Ronald Reagan began his term at the White House when U.S.-Iranian relations had entered a 
deep freeze that still lingers to this day. 1980 was a period when Iran and Iraq began warring with one 
another. Washington evidently did not want Iran to emerge victoriously. Khomeini was perceived by 
policymakers as a serious threat to the stability of the region and to vital interests, namely oil supplies 
and the security of Israel. However, Saddam Hussein was also recognized as a psychopath who was 
backed by the Soviet Union. Hussein was less of a threat to American interests but certainly no ally. 
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Initially, Washington decided to support the pro-Western regimes in the region by bulwarking their 
defenses. It was surmised and hoped that the combatants would weaken each other to the point that 
neither would emerge from the war as an aggressive regional hegemon. 
However as time passed it became evident the Reagan Administration was leaning in favor of 
Iraq. Washington had plenty of motives to favor Saddam over the Iranians. The United States was still 
reeling from the 1980 U.S. embassy takeover and truck bombings to its marine barracks in Beirut earlier 
in 1983. Despite the objections from Congress, Reagan had the State Department remove Baghdad from 
its list of state sponsors of terrorism, an act that opened avenues for economic aid and trade. Soon 
thereafter Reagan ordered a review of U.S. policy in the Middle East which resulted in a marked shift in 
favor of Iraq. Economic aid began pouring into Iraq in the form of hundreds of millions of dollars worth 
of loan guarantees to buy U.S. agricultural products; indirectly aiding the war effort.45 Washington also 
began passing high-value military intelligence to Iraq to help it fight the war, including information from 
U.S. satellites that helped fix key flaws in the fortifications protecting al-Basrah that proved important in 
Iran's defeat during the course of the war.46 
Reagan's special Middle East envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, was credited with establishing the back 
door avenue of communication to Saddam on a clandestine visit to Baghdad in December 1983. During 
the course of this visit and another in early 1984, Rumsfeld reassured the Iraqi leadership that it had 
broad latitude in prosecuting the war against Iran, to include using poison gas.47 A November 1983 
National Security Directive evidently set the stage for this stance indicating that U.S. policy was to do 
"whatever was necessary and legal" to stop Iran from winning.48 
In 1984 the CIA began providing Iraq intelligence that was utilized to calibrate its mustard gas 
attacks on Iranian troops.49 Subsequently the CIA established a direct Washington-Baghdad intelligence 
link and provided Iraq with data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography to assist Iraqi 
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bombing raids. It is evident this data was essential to Iraq’s effectiveness against the Iranians. During the 
course of the war Iraq continued to use chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Washington never 
commented publicly despite noting almost daily in internal reports the Iraqi use of chemical weapons. 
Although the use of chemical weapons in war is in violation of the Geneva accords of 1925, during the 
last major battle of the Iran-Iraq war, 65,000 Iranians were killed – many with poison gas.50 
The Iran-Iraq war endured for nearly eight years – from September of 1980 until August of 1988. 
The hostilities ceased when Iran accepted United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598, which 
led to a cease-fire in August 1988. Although the UN-arranged cease-fire ended to the fighting, the two 
isolated states pursued an arms race with each other as well as other countries in the region.51 
Shortly before the end of the Iran-Iraq War, July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes was patrolling the 
northern portion of the Straits of Hormuz. A group of Iranian gunboats had been threatening a Pakistani 
merchant vessel and one fired on the Vincennes. During the confrontation with the gunboats, the 
Vincennes picked up an aircraft on radar moving in its direction. After the plane failed to respond to the 
ship's warnings the Vincennes fired two surface-to-air missiles bringing the plane down. The aircraft 
turned out to be an Iran Air commercial jet carrying 290 people.52 There were no survivors and Tehran 
claimed it was an intentional act. President Reagan characterized the event as a terrible accident, 
apologized and offered to pay compensation to the victims. In February 1996, the United States agreed 
to pay Iran $61.8 million in compensation for the Iranians killed in the shoot down.53 
Another event characterizing hot and cold relations between the leaders of Iran and the U.S. is 
the worst political moment of Reagan’s eight years in the White House – the Iran-Contra scandal. The 
affair involved an arms-for-hostages scheme that could have resulted in his removal from office. Reagan 
had been cautioned by both his secretary of defense and state regarding the illicit nature of the 
clandestine operation but followed through despite their warnings. “Iran-Contra,” unfolded in the mid-
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1980s and became the sobriquet for a complicated back-channel operation during which U.S. 
government officials violated an arms embargo by secretly selling weapons to Iran. The arms were 
initially funneled through Israel and in return Iran was to help free American hostages held in Lebanon. 
Subsequently officials used the profits from the arms sales to illegally assist the Nicaraguan “Contra” 
rebels in toppling that country's duly elected Marxist government. However it was well known at the 
time that Congress, through the Boland Amendment, had prohibited U.S. aid to the Contras.54 
In November 1986 the Lebanese newspaper al-Shiraa reported that the United States secretly 
sold arms to Iran. The Iranian Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, confirmed the 
secret deal in a speech to the Iranian Parliament the following day. This revelation caused Chief of Staff 
Donald Regan to urge President Reagan to "go public" about the arrangement. However John Poindexter 
discouraged Reagan from doing so. As a result, Reagan went on to assure reporters that the allegations 
had emanated from the Middle East and had no foundation. However, days later the President changed 
his story in a televised address to the nation, when he admitted to shipping some missiles to Iran but 
denied that the arms were sold to win the release of American hostages. As the crisis continued to build, 
Reagan went before the press and perpetuated the falsehood that the United States had nothing to do 
with other countries or their shipments of arms to Iran, including Israel. Unfortunately, Poindexter had 
already briefed the press about the U.S. negotiations with Israel to provide the weapons making the 
falsity of Reagan's account utterly transparent to everyone.55 
President Reagan requested an independent review of all the events by a three-person 
commission headed by former Texas senator John Tower. A special prosecutor, Lawrence Walsh, was 
also assigned to look into possible illegal activities in the executive branch. Reagan maintained total 
ignorance of the actions of those who directly supervised the channeling of funds to Central America, 
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namely Colonel North and former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. However Reagan also 
resisted the implication that he was a passive and oblivious bystander in his own administration. 
In February 1987, the Tower Commission issued its report and concluded that there had been 
widespread abuse of power among renegade members of Reagan’s staff who allegedly, without the 
President’s knowledge, engineered and engaged in an illicit conspiracy. The report faulted Secretary of 
State George Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and President Reagan himself for their 
evident inability to effectively oversee the actions of their subordinates. The report stopped short of 
accusing the President of engaging in or approving any illegal conduct. Special Prosecutor Lawrence 
Walsh later made similar findings and was unable to establish complicity on the part of the President.56 
 
 
Shah Ali Hosayni Khamenei 
President Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani 
President George H.W. Bush’s Term 
When Shah Khomeini died in June 1989, the Assembly of Experts, an elected body of senior 
clerics, chose the outgoing President of the republic to be his successor. Ali Khamenei, assumed power 
of the republic in what proved to be a smooth transition. Khamenei also transformed the position of 
supreme leader by bringing many of the powers of the presidency with him into that office, turning it 
into an omnipotent overseer of Iran's political scene.57 
In August 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the National Assembly, was 
elected President by an overwhelming majority. Iran’s relations with the West began to improve under 
Rafsanjani’s guidance. This was due in part to Rafsanjani’s role in obtaining the release of Western 
hostages held by pro-Iranian Shi’ite groups in Lebanon, the last of whom was released in 1992. 
Rafsanjani, who has long been viewed as a Machiavellian figure in Iranian politics, maintained close ties 
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with Khomeini during the years following the 1979 Islamic revolution and consolidated strong support 
amongst Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards. Rafsanjani proved to be more pragmatic on issues involving 
Iran's dealings with the West and was very much disturbed by Iran's growing isolation.58 
In August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait over allegations that Kuwait was slant drilling 
into Iraq territory. The mechanized infantry, armor, and tank units of the Iraqi Republican Guard 
invaded Kuwait and seized control of that country.  The invasion triggered Operation Desert Shield, a 
U.S. led effort to deter any invasion of Kuwait's oil rich neighbor, Saudi Arabia.59 Although Khamenei 
condemned the invasion he bitterly criticized Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Arab countries that 
invited American troops into their countries after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Khamenei characterized 
the event as a holy war asserting that anyone who engaged America's aggression, greediness and its 
plans to encroach on the Persian Gulf region had engaged in a holy war in the cause of Allah. 
Furthermore, he indicated that anyone killed on that path was a martyr. 
Gary Sick, an American expert on Iranian affairs, suggested that Khamenei’s remarks were 
motivated by Iran's desire to keep oil prices high, preserve its “revolutionary” credentials and keep 
President Hussein in a protracted confrontation with the United States.60 Despite Khamenei’s strident 
rhetoric, Iran remained neutral during the U.S. led intervention in Kuwait and subsequent march into 
Iraq. It is also important to note that Tehran pursued an almost contradictory foreign policy in this case. 
It strongly condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait while energetically pursuing a peace settlement with 
Baghdad. Tehran’s seemingly ambivalent stance towards Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait demonstrated the 
pragmatic leadership of President Rafsanjani's Government. Although Washington had engaged Iran’s 
brutal, long-time foe (Saddam Hussein), Tehran was also not prepared to reject the notion that the 
United States is a force seeking to dominate the gulf region's oil resources to the detriment of both Iran 
and Iraq.61 
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In January 1991 Bush asked Congress for “all necessary means” to expel Iraq from Kuwait. He 
received congressional approval to use force, and in mid-January 1991 the U.S.-led allies launched a 
punishing aerial assault on strategic sites in Iraq. In a ground war in late February, allied forces drove 
the Iraqis from Kuwait and subsequently well into Iraq. Bush’s popularity rose to historic highs for a 
President, but he drew criticism for ordering a cease-fire before Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, was 
ousted. President George H.W. Bush later defended his administration's decision to forgo invading Iraq 
and toppling Saddam from power after Iraqi forces were forced to withdraw from Kuwait. Bush felt that 
occupying Iraq would have unilaterally exceeded the United Nations’ mandate and would have 
destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression his administration hoped to establish. In 
his opinion the invasion route would have left the U.S. as an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land 
where the coalition forces would have collapsed; the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling 
out as well. Furthermore, under those circumstances, Bush saw no viable "exit strategy" which violated 
another one of his administration’s principles.62 
Although Iran criticized Washington during and in the wake of the Gulf War, accusing it of 
regional interference, Khamenei and Rafsanjani showcased their Persian pragmatism. Despite strident 
rhetoric, Iran remained neutral as the U.S. engaged and hobbled the military apparatus of its arch 
nemesis – Saddam Hussein. The Hussein regime represented the region’s principle strategic 
counterweight to Iran and evidently Tehran recognized that although U.S. forces had occupied 
neighboring territories – the first Bush Administration was, in essence, performing an enormous favor 
for Iran. 
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President Clinton’s Term 
Surprisingly, the demonization of Tehran reached new heights during the course of the Clinton 
Administration. According to the Clinton Administration, Iran represented a threat to the international 
community as a whole in several areas. First, it had speculatively engaged in sponsoring international 
terrorism in order to destabilize particular American allies. Second, it opposed the notion of an Arab-
Israeli peace process and allegedly sought to derail it. Third, it actively endeavored to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Fourth, Tehran was presumably rebuilding its military machine with offensive equipment and 
technology, which posed a threat to the Persian Gulf region. Finally, Tehran's record of human rights 
was spotlighted and evaluated as dismal at best. The Clinton Administration’s assertions were 
unequivocal in that Washington perceived Tehran as a hostile international actor. Iranian leadership 
reaction to Clinton’s accusations was best summed up by President Rafsanjani's reply to an American 
correspondent who asked whether Tehran could prove its innocence. President Rafsanjani emphasized 
that in a court one is innocent until proven guilty and that it was the responsibility of the accuser to 
prove the guilt, not the accused.63  
In 1993, the Clinton Administration turned down a request by Boeing to sell Iran civil aircraft 
needed for expanding Iran Air's level of operations. A majority of Iran Air's fleet consisted of Boeings 
and the year prior Iran Air had negotiated the purchase of 16 Boeing 737-400's. As a result of the sale 
ban, Boeing lost a $900 million contract and Iran Air purchased aircraft from the European aerospace 
consortium Air Bus. Similarly, in 1993 BP America had negotiated the sale of a chemical fertilizer plant 
with Iran. The sale was again prohibited by the Clinton Administration on the grounds that the 
technology may be of a dual purpose nature, resulting in a $100 million sales loss to BP America. 
The most publicized loss regarding sanctions on Iran has been Conoco, a subsidiary of DuPont 
Corporation. On 15 March 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957, banning U.S. 
contributions to the development of petroleum resources in Iran. It came 10 days after Conoco had 
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signed a $1 billion contract for developing two off-shore Iranian oil and gas fields. Pressure from the 
U.S. Congress continued and two months later President Clinton issued Executive Order 12959. The 
second order expanded the previous sanctions to include a total trade and investment embargo on Iran. 
Iran was declared an extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the 
U.S.  This executive order has some extraterritorial reach since U.S. companies would not be allowed to 
facilitate any activities involving trade with Iran and severe restrictions were imposed on the re-export 
of U.S. or partially-U.S. products.  Iran’s alleged support for international terrorism and development of 
weapons of mass destruction were among the justifications for President Clinton’s executive orders.64 
As a result of the Executive Orders and investment sanctions, Conoco was forced to withdraw from the 
contract to develop the Iranian oil and gas fields. This paved way for France's Total, which ultimately 
assumed control of the project.65  
In late 1994, the Republicans gained control of both Houses of Congress and were looking at 
sanctions against unpopular foreign governments as a way to placate powerful pressure groups such as 
the America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Additionally, the Republican dominated 
Congress also sought to erode the power of the Democratic Clinton Administration. AIPAC had exerted 
considerable pressure on the Administration and Congress to act against Iran for a number of reasons. 
Iran had allegedly supported terrorist activities against Israel, which had experienced a series of 
bombing attacks perpetrated by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israeli intelligence had also 
informed Washington that Iran was acquiring components for nuclear weapons. Israel highlighted 
Russian plans to assist Iran in the completion of a civilian nuclear power reactor in Bushehr; a reactor 
Washington had pressured Germany not to build. AIPAC pushed for comprehensive U.S. sanctions 
against Iran, including secondary U.S. sanctions against foreign companies seeking to invest in Iran’s 
petroleum sector. 
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What followed was a race between conservative Republicans and the Clinton Administration on 
Iran. President Clinton was under intense pressure to introduce legislation on U.S. sanctions against Iran 
to avoid passage of even more restrictive legislation introduced by Senator D’Amato of New York who 
was supported on this issue by the majority in the U.S. Senate. Despite the Administration’s earlier 
executive orders (March and May 1995), the Senate passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 
1996 (Libya had been added by Senator Kennedy because of the Lockerbie bombing). The bill passed 
with almost no opposition in the Senate and House, which shows how little power the international oil 
companies have on matters pertaining to Middle East policy.66  
ILSA was passed when Iranian President Rafsanjani was still in office. Moderate Iranian 
President Mohammad Khatami was elected during a period when Washington’s efforts to contain Iran 
were at their highest. However, ILSA had met with stiff resistance throughout the world, nowhere more 
so than in Europe due to its extraterritorial nature. ILSA also made things difficult with pro-western 
Arab states in the Gulf who engaged in substantial commerce with Iran. Iran’s economy is dependent on 
foreign investment and Tehran conceded that ILSA was effective in deterring such investment. In an 
August, 1998 report to the UN, Iran stated that ILSA had “led to the disruption of the country's 
economic system, . . . caused a decline in its gross national product, . . . [and] weakened the country's 
ability to deal with its international lenders, . . . which impeded credit transactions.” Iran went on to 
report that ILSA created difficulties in the petroleum and oil sector, such as “reduction in international 
investment, delays in oil projects, cancellation of some tender contracts, technological shortcomings, 
and increased negotiating expenses.” President Khatami acknowledged later in 1998 that U.S. sanctions 
had ''inflicted damage” upon Iran.67 
The animosity between the U.S. and Iran, rather apparent during Clinton's first term, lessened to 
a certain degree during the period following his reelection. The precipitating factor was the unexpected 
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and overwhelming election of Mohammed Khatami as Iran’s president in May 1997. Surprisingly, 
Khatami captured approximately 70% of the popular vote. Khatami was a moderate Iranian leader who 
sought to increase cultural and personal freedom in Iran. He also sought to improve relations with Iran’s 
Gulf neighbors, Europe, and, to a lesser degree, the United States. However, Khatami would remain 
challenged by hardliners in the Iranian regime to include Iran's religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei, a 
supreme leader with complete control over important institutions such as Iran’s military and police.68  
Iranian foreign relations with Washington during the Clinton Administration generally assumed 
a posture of accommodation. However, it was evident that the Clinton Administration succumbed to 
domestic pressures from partisans and special interest groups and ultimately did not perceive Tehran as 
a regime with which Washington could diplomatically interact. In every instance that President 
Rafsanjani and Khatami signaled that economic interaction would be the basis of rapprochement those 
advances were casually rebuffed.  
 
President George W. Bush’s Term 
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami took office in 1997, before George W. Bush was elected 
U.S. President in 2001. Khatami was subsequently re-elected in 2001 by an overwhelming majority. He 
was perceived by many as more amenable to relations with the United States as well as opening up his 
country to democratic reforms. Khatami was viewed as a possible reformist countermeasure to Iran’s 
supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and his coterie of clerics. Many felt the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations would ultimately diplomatically engage Khatami – a long awaited alternative to Iran’s 
fundamentalist hardliners. However, President Clinton had sealed avenues for economic engagement in 
furtherance of Iranian containment. President Bush soon concluded with his senior foreign policy 
advisers that Khatami and his supporters in the government were "too weak, ineffective and not serious 
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about delivering on their promises" to transform Iranian society. Bush revealed his stance publicly in a 
strongly worded presidential statement during which he praised large pro-democracy street 
demonstrations in Iran. The shift emboldened foreign policy experts who had urged a tougher approach 
toward Tehran – a setback for the State Department, which had spearheaded efforts to engage the 
Khatami leadership.69 
The oil industry was extremely optimistic that the Bush Administration would allow the 
unilateral ILSA to expire and die quietly. Both President Bush and Vice President Cheney were oilmen 
who realized that unilateral sanctions were ineffective and were only preventing U.S. oil companies 
from competing with Europe. Many future senior members of the Bush Administration were somewhat 
outspoken in their opposition to unilateral sanctions and the oil industry assumed the Bush 
Administration would not renew ILSA when it expired in August 2001. However, the Cheney energy 
report in the spring of 2001 surprised many in that it favored the use of sanctions as a tool to advance 
national and global security objectives. The new Administration’s policy towards sanctions was no 
doubt influenced largely by AIPAC, which was actively pushing for a renewal of ILSA. In June 2001, 
74 Senators sponsored a five-year ILSA extension and in August 2001 President Bush signed the ILSA 
Extension Act into law.70 Public statements made by the Iranian President Khatami and his counterparts 
revealed that Iran's policy towards the U.S. would not change unless the U.S. took the first step. “As 
long as American politicians act under the influence of certain lobbies, harming even the interests of 
American companies and hinder the Iranian economy by sanctions and embargoes, there will be no 
change,” Khatami stated during a press conference in June 2001. He added that “these sanctions are 
obstacles, and we do not accept any preconditions. If anyone is to impose any conditions, it should be 
us, who have been the victims of the oppressive policies of the United States.”71 
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The 9/11 attacks rearranged Washington’s approach to the Middle East, bringing Iran into focus 
geopolitically as a possible strategic ally that must be engaged in furtherance of the American led “war 
on terror.” Tehran harbored a powerful disdain for the likes of al-Qaeda and the Taliban and possessed 
influence in Afghanistan that was useful to Washington. The period leading up to the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan was a time of extraordinary strategic cooperation between Tehran and Washington. While 
Washington established the logistical aspects of the military engagement in Afghanistan, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs – Ryan Crocker – organized several discreet 
meetings with Iranian officials in Geneva. During the course of those meetings, Iran offered search-and-
rescue help, humanitarian assistance, and even advice on which targets to bomb in Afghanistan. The 
Iranians, who had extensive experience in Afghanistan, namely working with the main anti-Taliban 
coalition – the Northern Alliance – also informed Washington about how to negotiate the major ethnic 
and political fault lines in the country. During a conference to establish a post-Taliban Afghan 
government, Iran pressed its allies in the Northern Alliance to limit their demands for ministerial seats 
and ensured anti-terrorism language was engineered into the agreement.72 During the course of that 
international conference, the Iranians helped establish the post-Taliban Karzai government. “They were, 
in many ways, our principal collaborators at that meeting,” said James Dobbins, President Bush's envoy 
to the gathering. Dobbins indicated that the Iranian envoy, Javad Zarif, persuaded the Northern Alliance 
to share power with other factions, a crucial step in establishing Karzai's government.73 However, after 
Tehran’s cooperation during the course of the invasion of Afghanistan and Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai’s subsequent election, Washington immediately discouraged Karzai from seeking intimate ties 
with Iran. Alhtough Iran was publicly praised by the United States for their positive role in Afghanistan, 
shortly thereafter Tehran was identified by the Bush Administration as one of the three protagonists in 
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the infamous “axis of evil”.74 That label had bewildered and humiliated Iranians who were most vocal in 
regard to normalized relations with the United States. 
Khatami battled Iran's clerical hard-liners for eight years and transformed the nation's political 
landscape; however he failed to effect a much needed structural change. Khatami was constitutionally 
required to leave office after two consecutive terms. Senior statesman and former two-term President Ali 
Rafsanjani campaigned on a socially moderate and reform-minded platform, but evidently Iranian voters 
were more attracted to the revolutionary candidate. In June of 2005, the hard-line mayor of Tehran, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had invoked Iran's 1979 revolution and expressed doubts about 
rapprochement with the United States, was elected president of the Islamic republic in a landslide with 
62% of the popular vote.75 
Ironically, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and George W. Bush have more similarities 
than either would care to admit. Namely in the realm of their fiery speeches and confrontational stances 
that have served more to annoy the international community rather than appealing to it in a diplomatic 
sense. Ahmedinejad came into the Presidency at a time U.S. containment measures and debate over 
Iran’s nuclear intentions were in full swing. While reiterating his country’s commitment to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, Ahmedinejad inferred Washington was utilizing the U.N. Security Council as a 
tool of “threat and coercion”. Washington played a large role in helping craft a U.N. Security Council 
resolution passed in July 2006 that gave Iran until late August to suspend its uranium enrichment, asking 
the IAEA to report on Tehran's compliance, dangling the threat of sanctions if Iran refused. Tehran 
beamed unequivocally long before the deadline expired that it had no intention of suspending its 
uranium enrichment, which it asserts is for peaceful purposes. “All our nuclear activities are transparent, 
peaceful and under the watchful eyes of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency”, 
Ahmadinejad said. Ahmedinejad went on to accuse the U.S. of dragging its feet in Iraq in order to 
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preserve its occupation, “It seems that intensification of hostilities and terrorism serves as a pretext for 
the continued presence of foreign forces in Iraq.”76  
The Bush Administration has thus far resisted any suggestion of negotiations with Iran. But it is 
coming under increasing pressure from its European allies and from the leading senators on the Foreign 
Relations Committee to alter that dangerous attitude. The battle between American neoconservatives 
and Iranian hardliners persist despite many conciliatory gestures on the part of the Iranians. President 
Bush’s policy has not discouraged Iran’s nuclear endeavors. Rather, it has merely emboldened Iranian 
hardliners who argue that the Bush Administration has no interest in rapprochement with Iran and that it 
is in Tehran’s best interests to reach bomb capacity as soon as possible.77 
Ahmadinejad too has faced harsh domestic criticism. The Iranian President’s popularity has also 
plummeted on the basis of his failure to fulfill election promises with respect to the economy and 
individual freedom. A poll run by the Tehran-based news website “Baztab” two years after 
Ahmadinejad came to power found that his popularity had sunk substantially. A poll of 20,000 people 
revealed that 62.5% of respondents who had voted for Ahmadinejad in 2005 would not seek to reelect 
him. The Ahmadinejad Administration's aggressive and unyielding foreign policy is perceived by many 
Iranians as the cause of the increasing isolation of Iran and the sanctions imposed upon the country for 
refusing to halt its controversial nuclear program.78 
During the course of my travels within the Islamic Republic, I met several individuals who spoke 
favorably of President George W. Bush, but none who spoke positively of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 
Much like the American citizenry, most Iranians were historically myopic and were powerfully 
consumed by the political now. Commentary with regard to Ahmadinejad always began with a 
pronounced facial scowl and Iranian women were quick to attribute a renewed social rigidity to 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Fear of Ahmadinejad’s far reaching rigidity was underscored for this 
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researcher during the course of an interview conducted outside the Sadabad Palace in the Shemiran area 
of Tehran. Bita Molkava, a college educated English interpreter, spoke confidently on the matter of 
Iranian politics but noticeably lowered her voice to the level of a whisper when saying the name 
“Ahmadinejad”. Bita indicated his election did not occasion a positive environment for women and 
brought about a renewed enforcement of female dress codes.79 Ironically, President George W. Bush 
enjoyed popularity among the Iranian populace for his incessant castigation of the Iranian government, 
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, and the facilitation of his subsequent execution. On my 
return flight to the United States from Tehran I took the opportunity to interview the Iranian woman 
seated next to me, Mahnaz Mazaheri Assadi. Mahnaz was a strongly opinionated woman who held a 
PhD level education in the field of Bioscience and Biotechnology. She regarded the Ahmadinejad 
presidency with strong disapproval and felt his ascension to power was the product of Washington’s 
policy and harsh rhetoric towards Iran. Mahnaz surmised that renewed dialogue and diplomacy between 
Washington and Tehran would result not only in a vibrant Iranian economy but also a moderation of 
Iran’s rigid social codes.80  
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CHAPTER 3: STATE LEVEL EXAMINATION 
 
Terrorism 
Contrary to the rhetoric of rabid western ideologues, Muslims and Islamic entities across the 
globe were outspokenly vocal in their condemnation of the events on 9/11, characterizing them senseless 
attacks on innocent human beings. Many in the Islamic world were as shocked and disturbed by the 
terrifying images of the event as those in the west. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was among 
the first world leaders to condemn the 9/11 attacks and express his sympathy stating, “On behalf of the 
Iranian government and the nation, I condemn the hijacking attempts and terrorist attacks on public 
centers in American cities which have killed a large number of innocent people.” “My deep sympathy 
goes out to the American nation, particularly those who have suffered from the attacks and also the 
families of the victims,” the Iranian President said in a statement, adding that “terrorism is doomed and 
the international community should stem it and take effective measures in a bid to eradicate it”. Khatami 
asserted that the Islamic Republic is treading a road to uproot terrorism and to this end, he noted, it will 
spare no efforts.81 Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also strongly condemned the suicide 
terrorist attacks but discouraged notions of an emotional counter-offensive in Afghanistan. “Mass 
killings of human beings are catastrophic acts which are condemned…..wherever they may happen and 
whoever the perpetrators and the victims may be,” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a 
televised September 2001 discussion.82 Furthermore, the conservative Iranian media and authorities 
followed suit in condemning the terrorist attacks. Hardliner magazine Siyasat-e-Ruz openly posited, 
“any act that victimizes innocent people, whatever their race or nationality, for achieving the goal of 
greedy international politics, is severely condemned and is a terrorist and anti-human act.” Iranian 
citizens also mourned America’s losses and responded with a genuine and spontaneous outpouring of 
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sympathy. Sixty thousand spectators observed a minute of silence during a soccer match in Iran’s Azadi 
stadium. Hundreds of young Iranians held a candlelit vigil in Tehran for the victims who perished in the 
9/11 attacks. The routine chants of “death to America” that had become a staple part of Friday prayers in 
Iran ceased in deference to American suffering. The degree of unanimity exhibited over a foreign policy 
issue was unprecedented in the history of the revolutionary Islamic Republic.83  
From an ideological standpoint the worldviews of al-Qaeda and Iran are completely at odds. Iran 
is a stable sovereign entity and al-Qaeda is a radical non-state terrorist actor. Iran seeks to shore up its 
national security interests while al-Qaeda endeavors to eliminate national boundaries and re-establish the 
caliphate, the seventh-century Islamic empire. The figureheads of al-Qaeda leaders completely reject the 
notion of solidarity between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims and exclude the Shi’a from their midst; namely 
the sect that predominates in Iran – Twelver Shi’a.84 The Iranian response to 9/11 led to expectations 
that Washington would seize the opportunity for limited rapprochement and factor Iran into an anti-
Taliban coalition – a notion that was overwhelmingly prudent in a geopolitical sense. The Iranian 
overtures were more than subtle in that Tehran was willing to put aside its grievances and join the west 
in eradicating unsavory elements – especially the Taliban.  Iran had regularly supplied the Northern 
Alliance, a collection of mainly Tajik and Uzbek anti-Taliban militias, with arms and intelligence. 
Iranian intelligence officers regularly meet with Northern Alliance commanders. Diplomats in Tehran 
say that information gleaned from those meetings is regularly relayed to India and Russia, which also 
supported the Northern Alliance. A majority Shi’a Muslim country, Iran had opposed the Sunni 
extremist Taliban since 1996 when it assumed power over Afghanistan. Iran denounced the Taliban’s 
extremist version of Islam asserting that it has cast a negative light upon the faith. In a domestic sense, 
Iranian officials had legitimate reasons to be concerned regarding the Taliban’s anti-Shi’a views and the 
presence of a hostile regime with the backing of two regional powers – Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – on 
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their border. Additionally, Iran and the Taliban had been at odds since Taliban forces, during the course 
of a military offensive against the Northern Alliance, killed 11 Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif in 
1998.  
Iranian parliamentarian Mohammad Kazem Jalili seemed to confirm Tehran’s desire to 
cooperate with the U.S. when shortly after the 9/11 attacks he told The Washington Post that “Iran is 
interested in joining the anti-terrorism coalition,” and that such a development would positively impact 
future relations between Tehran and Washington. A mid September report in Canada's National Post 
also contributed to the notion of rapprochement. It was reported that, via a Canadian intermediary, 
Tehran sent a message to Washington that there would be no Iranian opposition to military strikes 
against the parties responsible for the September 11 attacks.85 Although the White House and the State 
Department had expressed interest in a gradual rapprochement with Iran, the U.S. Congress failed to 
demonstrate a willingness to expend political capital on the Iran issue. No doubt, Tehran was willing to 
cooperate but such engagement would have necessitated incentives on Washington’s part. Meaningful 
incentives for Iranian cooperation would have entailed carrots such as a lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, 
the withdrawal of U.S. opposition to Caspian Sea pipelines traversing Iran and an end to U.S. attempts 
to isolate Iran internationally.86 
Evidently Washington needed Iran’s influence in Afghanistan – namely in getting the Northern 
Alliance to support the Karzai post-Taliban Afghan government engineered by Washington. Iran 
rendered vital assistance and as a result they did ultimately seize an opportunity to settle an old score 
with the Taliban who had long been in their crosshairs. Iranian assistance surely came as a pleasant 
surprise to Washington’s right wing ideologues. During this period of warming relations between 
Washington and Tehran, President George W. Bush delivered his first State of the Union address in 
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January 2002. During the speech Iran was mentioned as a member state within an “axis of evil” that 
aggressively pursued weapons of mass destruction and exported terror. Bush went on to claim that Iran, 
in union with terrorist allies, was arming to threaten the peace of the world. The speech immediately 
dashed all hopes of rapprochement and alienated Iranian moderates who had pressed for reconciliation 
with Washington. In light of Tehran’s vital support during the course of the U.S. led invasion of 
Afghanistan, many in the international community were shocked to hear the American’s characterizing 
the Iranian’s as evil. Moderate Iranian President Khatami immediately criticized President Bush’s 
characterization of Iran accusing a U.S.-Israeli alliance of “exploiting the ominous phenomenon of 
terrorism as an excuse for creating war and domination.” The convergence of interests in Afghanistan 
was evidently ephemeral revealing that hostility between Tehran and Washington will not be easily 
overcome. Khatami highlighted President George W. Bush's inexperience in world affairs and the clout 
of pro-Israel factions in Washington as the basis for the fomenting of an escalation of violence 
threatening to ignite the Middle East. The reformist movement in Iran sustained a sharp setback as a 
result of President Bush's rhetoric. The "axis of evil" comment clearly eliminated the opportunity for 
convergence between Tehran and Washington over a shared antipathy toward Afghanistan’s Taliban 
regime. Iranian moderates had begun to compete for influence in foreign policy, an arena dominated by 
Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. However, President Bush’s speech immediately dashed all notions 
of moderates gaining traction in that respect. Khatami indicated that threats from Washington, 
specifically President Bush, resulted in the hardening of “national solidarity” in Iran, rhetoric that 
inferred the “axis of evil” comment had dramatically reduced his domestic political clout.87 
Without any support by intelligence analysts, the Bush Administration has persistently alleged 
that Iran has harbored al-Qaeda operatives who had fled from Afghanistan and that they had participated 
in planning terrorist actions. Pentagon officials were also leaking information to the media and their 
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audiences in order to infer that they had evidence that Al Qaeda had been provided “safe haven” in Iran 
and was planning and directing terrorist activities abroad. However, a majority of U.S. intelligence 
analysts specializing on the Persian Gulf perceived that the Al-Qaeda operatives situated in Iran, who 
were in communication with operatives elsewhere, were in hiding rather than being harbored by the 
Iranians. A former national intelligence officer for Near East and South Asia – Paul Pillar – revealed 
when being interviewed by Inter Press Service in a 2006 interview that the “general impression” was 
that al-Qaeda operatives were not in Iran with the complicity of the Iranian authorities.88 Kenneth 
Pollack, a former CIA analyst who was a Persian Gulf specialist on the National Security Council staff 
in 2001 stated in his book, The Persian Puzzle, “These al-Qaeda leaders apparently were operating in 
eastern Iran, which is a bit like the Wild West.” However, he also pointed out, “It was not as if these al-
Qaeda leaders had been under lock and key in Evin prison in Tehran and were allowed to make phone 
calls to set up the attacks.”89 During the course of my field research in Iran I discussed the notion of 
Usama bin Laden or al-Qaeda operatives operating within Iran with the complicity of Iranians with an 
English teacher in Isfahan, Mehrdad Doulatshahi. Mehrdad suggested that those who would consider 
such an idea to be true were truly ignorant with regard to the Islamic world and Middle Eastern politics. 
Mehrdad further added that Iranians viewed Islamic extremism with a profound hatred and would tear 
bin Laden or any of his operatives to pieces with their bare hands if they encountered them within Iran.90 
Intelligence reports have confirmed that Tehran is no friend to al-Qaeda and remains committed 
to preventing its operatives from utilizing its territory as a safe house or regional pathway. In early 2007, 
the CIA sent an urgent report to President Bush's National Security Council indicating that Iranian 
authorities had arrested two al-Qaeda operatives traveling through Iran on their way from Pakistan to 
Iraq. The operatives were captured while traversing a well-worn, if little-noticed, passage utilized by 
militants determined to engage U.S. troops in Iraq. Intelligence officials presented the detentions to 
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Bush's senior policy advisers as evidence that Iran was evidently committed to preventing al-Qaeda 
operatives from utilizing its soil as a thoroughfare to zones of conflict. This intelligence assessment 
came at a time when the Bush Administration, in an effort to push for further U.N. sanctions on the 
Islamic Republic, was preparing to publicly accuse Tehran of cooperating with and harboring al-Qaeda 
operatives. However, the accusation would have been groundless in light of Iran’s early cooperation in 
the U.S. led war on terror. According to senior U.S. intelligence and administration officials, when al-
Qaeda militants fled by droves into Iran from Afghanistan in the winter of 2001, Tehran handed over 
hundreds of them to U.S. allies and provided U.S. intelligence with the names, photographs and 
fingerprints of those it held in custody. In early 2003, Iran offered to turn over high-value al-Qaeda 
targets directly to the United States in exchange for a group of exiled Iranian militants hiding in Iraq. 
Among the high level detainees was Usama Bin Laden’s son, therefore President Bush’s top advisors 
pushed for the exchange being that the trade would most likely have produced a wealth of valuable 
intelligence on al-Qaeda. Although the trade would have released individuals on the State Department’s 
terrorist list, they were individuals who had aligned with Saddam Hussein in effort to overthrow the 
Iranian government and were not in danger of wandering free after the exchange. Vice President Cheney 
and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld convinced President Bush to rebuff the exchange offer. 
The trade was rejected on the basis that any cooperation would legitimize Iran and other “sponsors of 
terrorism”. Ultimately, the National Security Council indicated it would accept intelligence on al-Qaeda 
from Iran but would give nothing in exchange for such cooperation.91 
Both Tehran and Washington’s interests are clearly consonant in regard to radical organizations 
such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which makes the aversion to rapprochement all the more politically 
irrational. Additionally, radical elements benefit from Iran and the United States being at odds over an 
issue where they are natural allies. 
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Capitalizing upon the lingering animus, Bin Laden is alleged to be engineering plans such as 
exploiting or even triggering an all-out war between the United States and Iran. Evidence suggests that 
Al Qaeda in Iraq and elements of the Iraqi Sunni community increasingly consider Iranian influence in 
Iraq to be a far greater threat than the American military occupation. In a Shi’ite-dominated Iraq, al-
Qaeda fears the Sunni minority would become politically benign after the American exodus.  
It is important to note that a war between America and Iran would benefit the jihad against both 
groups. By pitting two of the Sunni jihadis worst enemies against each other, the radicals would be 
essentially killing two birds with one stone. A full-scale U.S. invasion and occupation of Iran would be a 
jackpot for al-Qaeda. The endeavor would presumably depose the Shi’ite regime in Tehran, further 
antagonize Muslims worldwide, and expand al-Qaeda's battlefield against the United States so that it 
extends from Anbar Province in the west to the Khyber Pass in the east. It is well known, especially 
amongst al-Qaeda operatives, that the U.S. military is currently overly committed in its occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. If the U.S. is to invade Iran, it is expected that Washington will resort to the use of 
nuclear weapons. According to Bruce Riedel, a former Special Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Near East Affairs on the National Security Council (1997-2002), the biggest danger is that 
al-Qaeda will deliberately provoke a war with a "false-flag" operation (a terrorist attack carried out in a 
way that would make it appear as though it were Iran’s doing). Reidel has posited that Washington 
should remain extremely wary of such machinations on the part of radical organizations such as al-
Qaeda.92 A document recovered in an al-Qaeda hideout in Iraq indicated the terrorist organization 
considered drawing the United States into a war with Iran in order to undermine the effectiveness U.S. 
and Iraqi forces have had putting the organization to rout. The document’s author bemoaned the fact that 
al-Qaeda had been greatly weakened and posited that opening another front in the war would divert U.S. 
efforts in Iraq. According to the memo part of the diversion is “to entangle the American forces into 
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another war against another country,” or to create friction between the United States and its Shi’ite allies 
in Iraq. The document suggests “first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America and the 
West in general, of the real danger coming from Iran.” Furthermore insurgents proposed fabricating 
“bogus messages” that Iran has chemical or nuclear weapons or that its agents planned to hit targets in 
the West.93  
In the event of a terrorist attack against the U.S. or its interests abroad, accurately assigning 
blame would be of paramount importance to avoid improper retaliation. This would require very careful 
intelligence work that would be much easier should Tehran and Washington finally recognize their 
convergence of interests and makes rational political choices.  
 
Revolution Exportation 
Dr. Houman Sadri defines a “radical revolutionary idealist” as one who has an extreme sense of 
mission for exporting their revolution by any means. He goes on to add that what separates this type 
from the rest of the idealists is that they do not confine themselves to employing rhetoric and spiritual 
support as do most idealists. Rather, their goal is to send material, particularly military, support to 
groups abroad with similar ideologies. Numerous American presidential administrations, including that 
of President George W. Bush, have designated the spread of democracy as their principal foreign policy 
objective positing the notion that nascent democracies will make the world a better and safer place for 
Americans. Such mentalities fly in the face of democratic principles in their blatant disregard of the fact 
that the imposition of any ideology via “gunboat diplomacy” is inherently undemocratic. As posited by 
Dr. Sadri, romanticism and optimism blind the idealist to essential facts and such individuals are 
simplistic and gullible in assuming that their particular revolution is actually exportable. By examining 
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the foreign policies of both states one undeniable notion is elucidated; Iran and America are far more 
alike in their revolutionary principles than they are different. Much like the American Revolution, the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979 was an internal revolt driven by principles that were both spiritually and 
culturally relevant to the populace. This point is highlighted by Dr. Sadri in that a revolution that is to be 
legitimate, decisive, and successful must be deeply rooted within a particular society.94 Both countries 
are soon to discover at some cost that the fomentation of their revolutionary ideals and subsequent 
attempts to export their respective ideologies, under a “one size fits all” rationale, is both foolish and 
culturally insensitive – a ticking time bomb laden with far reaching consequences. This salient reality 
makes the notion of the exportation of the Iranian revolution all the more absurd. 
As indicated by Kenneth Timmerman, director of the Middle East Data Project Incorporated, the 
Islamic Republic’s success in exporting its revolution is checkered at best. The revolution lost the bulk 
of its legitimacy with the death of the Islamic regime’s founder – Ayatollah Khomeini. His successor, 
Ali Khamenei, vitiated his predecessor’s goals primarily through his lack of charisma and religious 
credentials. This is not to suggest that Tehran is innocent of subversive activities abroad. However the 
Islamic Republic now utilizes more classical means of achieving foreign policy objectives in lieu of 
ideology exportation.95 Iran is a unique state beset by competing internal forces, clerical radicalism and 
political pragmatism. Moderate politicians routinely struggle to consolidate power through appeasement 
of hardliner clerics while at the same time attempting to establish normalized relations with the outside 
world that are vital to the Iranian economy. Under the guidance of a supreme clerical leader, Iran is still 
certainly guided by its Islamic values. Yet, Iran is fast becoming more politically pragmatic with the 
realization that its revolution is clearly not exportable. International editor of United Press International, 
Claude Salhani, has indicated that while Iran's clerical leadership has tried "to interest a number of 
countries to follow in their footsteps, they ultimately failed.” “There is not one country that has adopted 
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the Iranian system,” Salhani observes. He noted that Iran's revolution has been unsellable outside its 
borders and now Iran is beginning to incrementally swing back towards a more moderate center. He has 
urged the world to consider that although Iran has not genuinely embraced democracy, it is a very 
different Iran from the one that ousted the Shah and hung those who dared oppose the Islamic 
Revolution. Salhani posited that with a large young population born after the revolution, change will 
continue apace.96 While in Shiraz, this researcher took the opportunity to interview an electrical 
engineer and Iranian historian, Parviz Rostaminezhad. Parviz had received his education in America and 
was quick to note that Iran’s clerical governance was vastly unpopular and would be eroded 
incrementally over time as newer generations whittled away at its rigid practices. “No one likes 
dictatorship,” Parviz uttered while looking me directly in the eyes with searing conviction. However 
Parviz cautioned that positive change would only endure if America engaged Iran politically, rather than 
militarily, and supported a subsequent cultural revolution that would yield an enduring Iranian 
democracy.97 
Hezbollah 
According to Augustus Norton, the Iranian revolution provided a context for another 
organization to emerge – Hezbollah – “the party of God.”98 Hezbollah was the most clearly identifiable 
echoing of the Iranian Revolution, which occurred after Israeli troops marched through Beirut to occupy 
the heavily Shi’ite populated Lebanon. Reacting to Israel’s invasion and under the aegis of Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, a group of Shi’a Muslim clerics led by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah 
established Hezbollah to promote Islam and resist Western influences in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s 
paradigm was evidently inspired by the Revolution of Iran, which had culminated in the overthrow of 
Iran’s secular government in 1979. Iran also provided generous economic support and much needed 
armaments. Hezbollah hoped that Iran, which was then fighting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, would be able 
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to export its revolution to Lebanon. Hezbollah was a more radical alternative to Lebanon’s mainstream 
Shi’a faction, known as the Amal movement that also sought greater power for Muslims in Lebanon.99  
When the Lebanese Civil War ended in 1990, Lebanon made the gradual transition towards 
parliamentary rule. Hezbollah’s leaders argued that the group should try to achieve power through 
politics, not just military action. Hezbollah and the Iranians then came to an agreement with the late 
Syrian President Hafez Assad. Hezbollah agreed to suspend its domestic revolutionary activities in 
exchange for the right to organize resistance to the Israeli Defense Forces in southern Lebanon. 
Hezbollah also dropped its objections to a political system that bars Shi’ites from the presidency and 
premiership and allots them only 21% of the seats in parliament. A noticeable paradigm shift also 
occurred. Hezbollah’s discourse changed from religious to nationalist, characterizing its engagement of 
Israel as a national liberation struggle rather than a holy war.100 
The manner in which Hezbollah has adapted itself politically suggests there will be no Iran-esque 
theocracy in Lebanon.  Hezbollah no longer conforms to its initial goal of forcefully remodeling 
Lebanon into an Islamic Republic. Rather than seeking to supplant the political hierarchy Hezbollah’s 
leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, utilized his military experience and successes to make substantial 
political gains. Upon assuming power in 1992, Nasrallah advocated strongly for Hezbollah to participate 
in Lebanon’s confessional system. Although radicals argued that he had betrayed the revolutionary 
principles of the group, Nasrallah insisted Hezbollah better served its interests by working within the 
political system rather than expressing itself from the fringes. In 2004, Hezbollah had nine of the 
twenty-seven seats reserved for Shi’ites in the 128-member Lebanese parliament; it also controlled three 
additional seats held by allied parties and occupied, respectively, by a Christian and two Sunni. 
Hezbollah has become deeply embedded into Lebanese society becoming socially democratic in their 
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provision of social services such as hospitals and job training in the Shi’ite community. Hezbollah has 
forged alliances across religious lines and is progressive in its levels of female activism. Nasrallah has 
also publicly conceded that an Islamist State would require an overwhelming popular desire, which he 
admits is not existent in Lebanon and probably never will be.101 Despite continuing support from Iran, it 
is evident that Hezbollah operates in accordance with a nationalist paradigm and not as a revolutionary 
extension of Iran. Support emanates from Iran not in support of shared Islamic goals, but rather in 
furtherance of pragmatic political ends such as the ending of a reviled occupation and engagement of 
Western endeavors via proxy elements. 
Bosnia 
When the Bosnian Muslims, who were also staunch allies of the West, were battling against the 
rampaging Croats and Serbs the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) rendered assistance. Iran 
and other Muslim countries supplied them with arms and training; the Iranians also participated in the 
battle alongside Bosnian Muslim soldiers. Some have attempted to characterize the incident as an 
attempt by Iran to export its revolution to Bosnia. However, similar to events in the recent invasion of 
Afghanistan, the U.S. military and the IRGC interacted positively in Bosnia. The Bosnians were clearly 
under siege and solicited the assistance of Iran. Subsequently, the IRGC trained and armed Bosnian 
fighters with the tacit blessing of the Clinton Administration and Iran continued to provide humanitarian 
support even after their military role ended.102 
According to Clinton Administration officials, the policy brought military pressure against the 
Serbs into the equation in order to obtain a better political settlement. The Iranian option was the least 
labor-intensive way of reaching that military equilibrium. The plan was successful in that working in 
union with aggressive NATO air strikes Croatians and Bosnians ultimately dealt the Serbs compelling 
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battlefield losses.103 In November 1995 the Dayton Agreement was signed in Paris, calling for the exit 
of foreign forces and ending the three and a half year war in Bosnia.  
For most of Bosnia's Muslims, the relationship with Iran was pragmatic in that it was established 
for the purposes of obtaining military assistance and had very little to do with religion or ideology. 
Additionally, after pressure from the Clinton Administration, the Iranians were expelled from Bosnia 
after their assistance was no longer needed.104 That Tehran sought to expand its influence into Europe is 
axiomatic.  However, the Bosnian’s desire to be part of the European community eliminates the notion 
of it becoming an Islamic republic and a pawn of Tehran. 
Chechnya 
There is no debating that Iran, like the rest of the Muslim world, sent aid to Muslim refugees in 
Chechnya. However, in sharp contrast to criticism of Russian conduct from other parts of the Islamic 
world, Tehran’s stance was relatively subdued in reaction to the war. Iran’s stance on the issue of 
Chechnya is a primary example of Iran’s migration away from religious fundamentalism to political 
pragmatism. Iran has consistently treated Chechnya as Russia’s internal matter and played an 
instrumental role in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to keep it from openly supporting 
Chechen rebels. But why would an Islamic republic that has routinely been accused of attempting to 
export its Islamic revolution to zones of conflict take the side of a non-Muslim state that has been 
accused of assailing separatists on the basis of their religion? 
Russia and Iran share many strategic interests in Central Asia, the Caspian and the Caucasus. In 
the past, both countries worked bilaterally to end the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s and the Taliban 
rule in Afghanistan. Both are major stakeholders bent upon maintaining peace and stability in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus; increasingly alarmed in regard to the growing U.S. economic and military 
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presence in the region. Russia is also Iran’s primary supplier of arms and technology. Gazprom, a 
Russian natural gas monopoly is actively developing the South Pars field in Iran and is poised to assist 
in the establishment of an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. The Russian Railways company is involved 
in a multinational project to build a 350-km line for the North-South Transport Corridor linking the town 
of Astara on Azerbaijan’s border with Kazvin in Iranian territory. As the world’s largest holders of 
natural gas reserves, both Russia and Iran support the notion of creating a gas OPEC. Iran also possesses 
observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and is likely to become a member of an 
energy club Russia is planning for the SCO. Russia and Iran share the same positions in that they wish to 
limit the presence of outside powers in the Caspian region, namely the U.S. and its desire to control the 
flow of energy from the region.105 
For those who accuse Tehran of ideological exportation, Chechnya is clearly not a suitable 
example. It has been Washington’s supposed ally, Saudi Arabia, which has historically been of the 
largest supporters of Chechen separatism. According to a State Department official who requested 
anonymity, between 1997 – 1999 alone, Saudi foundations and rich individuals have out poured over 
$100 million to support Chechen separatism. Radical Chechen leaders, such as Movladi Udugov and 
Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, have also found asylum in Saudi Arabia.106 Other than for humanitarian 
assistance Tehran’s ruling clerics have been muted in their rhetoric and have noticeably aligned 
themselves with Russia in this case. Not only does Tehran have numerous shared interests with Russia 
in a regional sense, a cozy relationship with Moscow enables Iran to stymie Washington’s economic 
sanctions and the endeavor to politically isolate Iran. 
 54
Egypt 
Egypt is not a state that borders Iran; however its regional clout in the Persian Gulf makes it 
extremely significant in Tehran's geostrategic planning vis-à-vis American and Israeli pressure. 
Ayatollah Khomeini severed relations with Egypt subsequent to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat came to peaceful terms with Israel and provided safe harbor to the 
deposed Shah Pahlavi. As a result, Egypt tacitly backed the Iraqi invasion of Iran that it was aware was 
supported by Washington.107 
 It has been posited that Tehran has attempted to instigate Islamic groups in Egypt to depose its 
leaders in a Khomeini-esque Islamic revolution. It is evident the Iranian revolution fomented a revival of 
the political role of Islamic edifices, such as mosques and madrassahs, in the mobilization of politically-
oriented Islamic elements throughout the Muslim world. Certain Islamic actors in Egypt were impressed 
by the proposed Iranian project of Islamic renaissance with its extra-national dimensions. However, 
during the period following the Iranian revolution, certain political Islamic actors in Egypt began to 
change their positions on the revolution. A negative attitude toward Shiism was fostered by a plethora of 
anti-Shi’ite publications which discredited the Islamic credentials of Shi’ites and questioned the true 
intentions of the "Shi’ite" Iranian revolution. Islamic Associations in Egyptian universities soon 
affirmed their ideological differences with the Shi’ite nature of the Iranian revolution, indicating they 
would rebuff support offered by Iran being that such support might be ostensibly one of Islamic 
solidarity with the true intention of imposing ideological hegemony.108 
Egypt and Iran resumed relations in the late 1980’s albeit at a very low level. However, in 
February 2008 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced he would be traveling to Egypt 
after accepting an invitation from Cairo. Such a visit would be the first time an Iranian president has 
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entered Egypt since ties were severed and communication occurred only at minimal levels of diplomatic 
contact.109 This recent thaw is an unprecedented act of diplomacy for Iran, being that cozying itself up to 
Egypt breaks new ground in the realm of Iranian foreign policy. Evidently, Tehran is actively 
endeavoring to divide the coalition of conservative Arab states that the Western alliance is intent on 
consolidating against Iran with Israeli participation. 
Iran’s revolution could never be exported to Egypt due primarily in part to schismatic religious 
differences – the Sunni/Shia divide. Both Cairo and Tehran will encounter overwhelming internal voices 
of opposition from their respective hardliner elements. Diplomatic relations between the two countries 
are clearly politically pragmatic and not sought on the basis of religious ideology. Tehran again 
strengthens it policy of non-alignment and further stymies Washington’s efforts to regionally isolate it. 
Egypt benefits from Iran’s counterweight to Israel as well, as using Iran’s stance as a model for its 
pursuit of nuclear technology for its economic and electricity needs.110 
 
Nuclear Technology 
Due to their concerns over an Iranian nuclear weapons program, Washington and a few of its 
allies have failed to acknowledge Iran's legitimate pursuit of a nuclear energy program. Washington’s 
containment policies and bellicose rhetoric have emboldened Tehran and only further encouraged its 
nuclear endeavors. It can be argued that Washington’s coercive approach has enabled Iran to become 
increasingly independent and has fostered warming relations with China and Russia – both states 
capable of providing Iran with advanced nuclear technology. The attempt to prevent Iran from obtaining 
nuclear technology is evidently futile and also blatantly ignores Tehran’s legitimate energy concerns. 
Recent history has witnessed the Middle East becoming increasingly volatile, which all the more calls 
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for a substantial change in American foreign policy towards Iran. Meaningful dialogue with Tehran is 
absolutely necessary in order to prevent Iran from becoming all the more intimidated and further 
developing its nuclear technology for military applications. 
 
Washington’s Complicity 
The current Bush Administration either banks upon a historically myopic electorate or has 
succumbed to a peculiar case of collective amnesia. Both Republican and Democratic administrations in 
Washington supported Shah Pahlavi’s elaborate plans to make nuclear power an integral part of Iran's 
domestic energy apparatus. This was due in large part to Pahlavi’s willingness to purchase the bulk of 
his nuclear equipment from the United States. Iran's first research reactor was established by the U.S. in 
1967 at Tehran University. Later that same year a U.S. corporation, United Nuclear, provided Iran with 
5.85 kilograms of 93 percent enriched uranium. In the 1970’s Washington continued to countenance 
Shah Pahlavi’s nuclear development in Iran on the basis of its growing energy demands and finite 
amount of natural resources. President Gerald Ford's Administration, for which Kissinger was Secretary 
of State, backed Iran's nuclear endeavors. It was posited that Tehran should "prepare against the 
time…about 15 years in the future…when Iranian oil production is expected to decline sharply." 
General Electric and Westinghouse ultimately acquired contracts to establish eight new reactors in Iran. 
By the late 1970’s, just prior to the Islamic revolution, Shah Pahlavi had intentions of purchasing a total 
of eighteen nuclear power reactors from the United States, France, and Germany. 
Washington had full intentions of selling billions of dollars worth of nuclear reactors, spare parts 
and nuclear fuel to Iran. It is most important to note that Pahlavi ran a brutal dictatorship unfettered by 
democratic elections or an independent judiciary. The National Security and Intelligence Organization 
(SAVAK), the Shah’s secret police, was notorious for arbitrarily torturing and murdering political 
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dissidents. The Shah also made no secret of plans to possibly militarize his nuclear program. 
Washington wasn’t concerned at the least about an Iranian nuclear program in the 1970’s; actually 
encouraging Iran to enrich its own uranium. Despite his regional ambitions Washington was not 
concerned as long as the Shah fulfilled important roles for his Washingtonian benefactors. In that 
respect, Pahlavi acted as regional gendarme for the U.S. and ensured a steady flow of petroleum to U.S. 
and other western oil companies.111 
 
Iran’s Legitimate Need 
When its war ended with Iraq in 1988, Iran was experiencing a massive population increase. 
Iran's population reached 70-million people mid-2006, which represented 16 percent of the Mid-East's 
444-million inhabitants. According to data released by the Population Reference Bureau (PRB), Iran's 
population alone will reach 89 million by 2025. According to the same source, Iran will also have a 
population of 102 million people in 2050.112 Iran's energy planners understood that demand would 
ultimately far exceed supply. Iran’s current level of oil and natural gas exploitation would not be 
sufficient to meet electricity demands. An analysis by a scientist in the National Academy of Sciences 
presaged that Iran might deplete its exportable oil by 2015.113 Its population growth rate and finite 
amount of resources suggest strongly that Iran cannot possibly rely exclusively on oil and gas for its 
energy needs. Due in large part to Washington’s unilateral sanctions that deter foreign investment, Iran’s 
aging oil industry has been unable even to match anywhere near the pre-revolution oil production level 
of 5.5 million barrels per day. Of Iran's 60 major oil fields, 57 need substantial repairs, upgrades and re-
pressurizing; this would require $40 billion over a period of 15 years. Iran's current production level of 
3.5 million barrels daily is increasingly geared toward domestic consumption, which has expanded by 
more than 280 percent since the 1979 revolution. If this trend continues, Iran will eventually become a 
 58
net oil importer by 2010. This would be a catastrophe for a country that relies on oil for 80 percent of its 
foreign income and 45 percent of its annual budget. 
It is routinely argued that Iran sits on a mountain of natural resources and should obtain 
electricity from natural gas-fired power plants that are allegedly more efficient. Experts have posited 
that this argument is wholly without merit. Professors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) conducted research that indicated the cost of producing electricity from gas or oil is comparable 
with the price tag of generating electricity with nuclear reactors. Gas and oil processes also produce 
carbon emissions which adversely effect the environment. Nuclear reactors would provide Iran with a 
renewable energy resource and allow it to focus upon maximizing its profits as a main supplier of 
energy to Asia and Europe. Although nuclear energy will not resolve Iran’s energy issues, it represents a 
significant move towards diversification of its domestic energy sources.114 
 
Nuclear Iran: Why Now? 
Washington legitimately condemned the Taliban giving it ultimatums that were met with non-
compliance. Ultimately, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and deposed the ruling Taliban regime. 
Washington also made many demands of Saddam Hussein and despite a lack international consensus, it 
unilaterally invaded Iraq. Subsequently, Saddam was turned over to the Iraqi’s who tried, convicted and 
marched him off to the gallows. Iran now has long been the target of U.S. saber-rattling regarding its 
role in a so-called “axis of evil,” and a being a sponsor of terrorism. Hawks in Washington also 
frequently utilize rhetoric such as “regime change” and the “military option” when discussing foreign 
policy towards Iran. Tehran has not only found itself surrounded by an ardent wall of U.S. military 
occupation, it has also witnessed two regimes at its northern and southern borders deposed by the United 
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States. It is without question that nuclear weapons would deter Washington from attempting to invade 
Iran as an extension of its “war on terror” in the Middle East. For hardliners in Iran, such as 
Ahmadinejad, nuclear weapons are seen as a legitimate means of defending Iran from what he must 
perceive to be a menacing and powerful regional presence. Iran’s hostile rhetoric, namely towards Israel, 
is evidently a maneuver to incite nationalist sentiment and divert domestic dissatisfaction away from 
Tehran; directing it towards the United States and its allies. 
Evidently Tehran seeks to develop its nuclear technology for legitimate energy needs, security 
and the prestige associated with such an accomplishment. For obvious reasons the global community 
must react with due care. That Iran has legitimate needs for nuclear power is self-evident and the 
international community must gain a rational consensus on this matter. In Tehran I interviewed Mehrdad 
Hemmatyar, an Iranian steel merchant routinely sidelined by U.S. sanctions. Although Hemmatyar made 
a good living selling steel to the Chinese he longed for an end to the U.S. sanctions so that his country 
could once again profit from dealings with the Americans. “History suggests we should not trust the 
Russians, and the Chinese are only engaging us for selfish economic ends,” he stated before going on to 
add, “We Iranians have so much in common with the American’s. We legitimately need each other and 
now circumstances indicate that we should become partners in many aspects.” Hemmatyar indicated that 
a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue would enable Iran to develop its nuclear energy program and 
put an end to the routine rolling blackouts in Tehran. Hemmatyar noted that the U.S. once supported an 
Iranian nuclear program and that Washington must be fully aware that Iran will ultimately become a 
nuclear power. He asserted that as a nuclear power Iran would not be a threat to Israel and a nuclear 
armed Iran would merely guarantee that neither side would benefit from attacking the other.115 
Moderate elements in Iran are politically pragmatic and are endeavoring to reconcile Tehran’s 
ruling theocracy with modernity. The clerical establishment is vastly unpopular and a fast swelling, 
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college educated younger generation will ultimately erode the clerical grip on Iran’s governance. 
However, moderate elements are only further marginalized by hostile rhetoric and policies of 
containment towards Iran. That Iran will eventually develop itself in a nuclear sense is not a looming 
threat for the world outside its borders. Historically speaking, nuclear powers have never considered 
invasion or all out war with each other. Stalemate or diplomatic resolutions are the usual outcomes. 
Most in the Middle East are quite aware that had Saddam Hussein actually developed a nuclear weapons 
program, he would likely still be alive and lording over Iraq today. However, he has passed from 
existence and the American flag now waves indefinitely over Baghdad. Any examination of this issue, 
unobscured by political or personal biases, suggests that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy is wholly 
warranted. That Iran would additionally seek to develop a nuclear arsenal and become a member of the 
nuclear guild is not an irrational pursuit – it makes complete sense. 
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CHAPTER 4: SYSTEM LEVEL EXAMINATION 
 
America has many interests in common with the government of Iran and its populace. On the 
basis of regional endeavors, the United States and Iran are natural allies.  Washington and Tehran have a 
shared interest in free access to the Persian Gulf and the free movement of oil out of that area. More 
important, both have a shared interest in stability in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both also have a common 
interest in every effective way to stopping the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan into Iran, Western 
Europe and the United States.116 
 
Washington & Tehran – Strategic Allies 
The United States has done a huge service for Iran. It has removed the Taliban to the east and 
Saddam Hussein to the west, Iran’s two greatest enemies and its greatest security threats. The United 
States has, in fact, given the Islamic Republic a very comfortable space to operate on the international 
scene; significantly more than it possessed before. Iran is quite active in southern Afghanistan. It is a big 
donor in building roads and other public projects. On the Iraqi side, the Iranians have been extremely 
helpful. They were the first country in the world to recognize the governing council set up by the United 
States. They are pursuing what they regard as a very enlightened policy in Iraq. They are offering 
petroleum products across the border, and they are opening their borders to trade. There are 
approximately 50,000 tourists in Iraq on any given occasion, traveling there primarily to visit the holy 
sites at Najaf and Karbala, which were previously closed to Iranian pilgrims for many years. Tehran was 
also very helpful in establishing the governing council and convincing the Shi’ite elements to cooperate 
in Iraq. In return for these efforts, the Islamic Republic was rewarded with Bush’s “axis of evil” 
speech.117 
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Afghanistan 
Tehran is inherently at odds with the Taliban's malevolent anti-Shi'ite ideology – ironically this 
was the primary impetus for Saudi Arabia and the U.S. supporting the Taliban movement in the mid-
1990’s. The Taliban massacred Shi'ites in the Hazarajat region and in northern Afghanistan during its 
years in power in Kabul; among the thousands some were actually buried alive. As mentioned earlier, in 
Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, the Taliban executed eight Iranian diplomats, which brought Tehran close to 
engaging the Taliban militarily. 
It is no secret that Iran has actively supported the Northern Alliance. Tehran not only rendered 
huge amounts of material and military assistance to the Northern Alliance groups, an Iranian special 
envoy, Alae'ddin Broujerdi, was a frequent visitor to the Amu Darya region and Panjshir Valley for the 
purpose of blandishing the anti-Taliban resistance. It was Broujerdi's persuasive skills that 
overshadowed the petty conflicts and turf wars amongst Northern Alliance groups and united them 
against the Taliban. Although American occupation of Afghanistan was irreconcilable with Tehran’s 
vital interests and core concerns, it put aside its differences with Washington. Because Afghanistan's 
long-term stability is of utmost concern to Tehran, it pragmatically supported the invasion.118 
Despite their dramatic international struggle over Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology, Tehran 
and Washington briefly put aside their enmity and cooperated rather well in Afghanistan – a place where 
interests converge. Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards fought alongside and advised the Afghan 
rebels who helped U.S. forces topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime in the months after the Sept. 11 
terrorist attacks. James Dobbins, a former State Department official who worked with diplomats from 
Iran and other Afghan neighbors to create the first post-Taliban government, says the Iranians “were 
equipping and paying the Northern Alliance. Russia and India were also helping, but at the time, Iran 
was the most active.” After the fall of the Taliban, Iran offered to help train and equip a new Afghan 
army, Dobbins says. That offer was rebuffed by the Bush Administration.119 
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Despite preexisting tensions, Afghanistan is a fine example of how U.S. and Iranian interests can 
constructively align in the Islamic world. Tehran aligned itself with the Northern Alliance in its struggle 
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, and had been financing opposition to the Taliban and Usama 
bin Laden long before the United States considered the invasion of Afghanistan.120 Tehran later allowed 
the United States military to use its airspace during the course of the post 9/11 invasion.121 In a gesture 
to openly display its full backing of the fragile post-Taliban government, Iran capitulated to Washington 
in 2002 by closing the office of dissident Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who subsequently left 
Iran.122 The Iranian government also pledged $560 million in development aid to President Hamid 
Karzai's government since 2002, half of which has already been administered. Afghan-Iranian relations 
have proven to be crucial, due to Tehran's economic and political influence inside Afghanistan. Former 
Secretary of State James Baker III, in unveiling the Iraq Study Group's recommendations on how to 
improve the situation in Iraq, pointed to Afghanistan as a possible model for U.S.-Iran cooperation in 
Iraq. This statement was supported by Iranian cooperation with Washington in Bonn, where during the 
course of an international conference they helped establish the Karzai government. “They were, in many 
ways, our principal collaborators at that meeting,” said James Dobbins, President Bush's envoy to the 
gathering. Dobbins indicated that the Iranian envoy, Javad Zarif, persuaded the Northern Alliance to 
share power with other factions, a crucial step in establishing Karzai's government.123 However, after 
Tehran’s cooperation during the course of the invasion of Afghanistan and Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai’s subsequent election, Washington discouraged Karzai from seeking intimate ties with Iran. 
Although Iran was publicly praised by the United States for their positive role in Afghanistan it soon 
found itself again vilified in Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. Washington not only perplexed Tehran, but 
erased many of the political opportunities previously dangling at Washington’s fingertips.124 
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Regardless of the breakdown in U.S. / Iranian ties, Tehran has continued to push ahead with 
development projects in Afghanistan, albeit amid little interaction with the American presence there. Its 
investments have helped make the country's western and central regions among the most stable there, in 
contrast with Afghanistan's south and east, where Taliban insurgents have heightened attacks on NATO, 
U.S. and Afghan forces in recent months, say Afghan officials and businessmen.125 Iran continues to 
effect positive changes within Afghanistan as it projects its influence into the bordering region. Afghan 
cities, such as Herat, are now enjoying the luxury of uninterrupted electricity and impeccably paved 
highways. United States officials have largely attributed this stunning development at Iran’s periphery to 
Tehran’s largesse.126 However, in August of 2007 President Bush took issue with Afghan President 
Hamid Karzai’s characterization of Iran as a “helper” in Afghanistan. President Bush pointedly 
disagreed stating, “I would be very cautious about whether the Iranian influence in Afghanistan is a 
positive force.” Yet a recent national intelligence estimate concluded that the al-Qaeda network had 
reconstituted itself and was reengaging coalition forces. However, al-Qaeda had not found refuge in Iran 
rather the mountainous territory in neighboring Pakistan127 – a so-called “ally” in the war against the 
Taliban. Those scrutinizing Iran’s conduct in Afghanistan will find they are extremely challenged in 
uncovering evidence of misconduct. Objective researchers ultimately concede that Iran, despite its 
policies elsewhere, has proven to be a benevolent neighbor to Afghanistan. 
Amid tensions over Iran's nuclear ambitions and alleged support for militants, Afghanistan 
remains one of the opportunities for Washington and Tehran to mend the relations cut off since 1979. 
Both Iran and the United States share a common goal: to eliminate the Taliban and establish a stable 
post-Taliban political order in Afghanistan. Apparent post 9/11 cooperation demonstrated to Afghan 
warlords they could not play America and Iran off one another and mutual concerns compelled Tehran 
to deport hundreds of suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had fled Afghanistan. While 
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America and Iran worked together, Afghanistan was much more stable than it is today, al-Qaeda was on 
the run, the Islamic Republic's Hezbollah protégé was comparatively restrained, and Tehran was not 
spinning centrifuges. Oddly, the Bush Administration conveyed no interest in building on these positive 
trends.128 Furthermore, Washington’s alienation of Iran via economic sanctions and “regime change” 
rhetoric threatens to erase the substantial progress made in Afghanistan, the primary battlefield in the 
“war on terror”. Mohammad Reza Bahrami, Iran's Ambassador to Afghanistan has indicated, “The 
disagreements we have with the international community do not have a place in Afghanistan,” he went 
on to add, “Our understanding for Afghanistan is that it can be a good model for cooperation among the 
international community.”129 
As will be seen in the following pages, Washington must seize the opportunity to move forward 
decisively toward strategic engagement with Iran. This will ensure success in its efforts to pacify violent 
elements and stabilize the environments inside Iran’s neighboring countries. Iran remains a partner vital 
to this endeavor by virtue of its shared culture, language, geographic location and early cooperation. It is 
not prudent to discard a potential ally with a demonstrated history of successfully pursuing its interests 
unilaterally within Afghanistan. It is important to note that Tehran could have elected to sideline itself as 
America toppled the Taliban, overtly abstaining to side with the “Great Satan” in the eyes of the Muslim 
world. Instead, Tehran cooperated with Washington’s efforts in Afghanistan and sided with the West 
against the Taliban. Why would a government that has been labeled as “fanatical” by many U.S. 
politicos assist the United States in a war against Muslim extremists? The Iranians were hoping that their 
assistance in Afghanistan would have strategic implications with an entire new relationship between 
Tehran and Washington as the ultimate outcome. “Iran made a mistake not to link its assistance in 
Afghanistan to American help in other areas and by just hoping that the U.S. would reciprocate,” said 
Javad Zarif, Iran's United Nations ambassador who was in charge of negotiations with Washington over 
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Afghanistan.130 The aforementioned activities overwhelming suggest that Tehran evidently desires 
normalized relations with Washington, which would also allow it to interact much more freely with the 
rest of the Western world. 
 
Iraq 
Since the toppling of Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime, Iraq is a state that has gone from 
bad to worse. The occupying force, the United States, claims to have a plan for success, but as the death 
toll continues to mount it is increasingly evident that Washington may have unwittingly opened 
Pandora's Box in the Arab World. The U.A.E. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed 
Hussain Al Sha'ali, indicated that his country historically looked upon the United States as a role model. 
However in his opinion, the war in Iraq appears to have been executed without a great deal of advanced 
planning. “Our countries tried to advise the U.S. not to go in to Iraq without a plan,” Sha'ali recounted, 
“Because of arrogance no one was willing to listen to advice from the region. Military might should be 
couched in wisdom. The U.S. didn't analyze the situation before invading. They dismantled the country's 
education, health care and security system.” In the wake of this invasion, U.S. occupation authorities 
eliminated Iraqis' jobs and tried to govern and police an entire country. As a result, Iraqis who lived in 
peace together for thousands of years became divided and headed for civil war.131 
Amidst tensions between Tehran and Washington lurk mutual concerns and powerful incentives 
to cooperate in order to back away from the precipice of deadly military confrontation. Washington is 
fast learning the unilateralism that enabled it to swiftly enter Iraq and dispose of Saddam, is now 
somewhat ineffective in managing the complex situation that has unfolded during the occupation. The 
United States now faces a stark choice. It must either escalate its confrontational policy with Iran or 
adopt a policy of engagement. Far from arresting the Iranian danger, escalation would most likely 
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present the United States with new perils. Given the balance of power in the region, a continued 
confrontational course with Iran would saddle the United States with the protracted commitment of 
setting up camp in the Persian Gulf indefinitely and deploying to other conflict zones in an environment 
of increasing radicalism. It would place the United States at the heart of the region's conflicts, leaving it 
all the more vulnerable to ideological extremism and terrorism at home and abroad. An American 
conflict with Iran would also undermine regional stability, jeopardize the economic gains of the Persian 
Gulf emirates and inflame Muslim public opinion. Persistent clashes with the United States will 
radicalize the Iranian theocracy and, more important, the Iranian public.132 
A crucial factor for stability in Iraq is cooperative relations between Iran and the United States. 
For the first time in Iraq’s history, the Arab-Sunni minority has been forced out of power and has been 
replaced, at least for the present time, by the Shi’ite majority. The success of this historical 
reconstruction of Iraq’s political system will depend largely on cooperation between the U.S. and 
neighboring countries, namely Iran. The decades-long political repression and economic discrimination 
against the Shi’ites will come to an end and Iraq’s new face is certain to have significant regional 
implications. However success will not materialize without the reduction of tension realized through 
cooperative relations between the United States and Iran.133 Tehran / Washington rapprochement would 
serve to foment stability in Iraq, where both parties evidently support the same Shi’ite-led government. 
In February 2007 a powerful senior Iraqi Shi’ite leader, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, indicated his country had 
urged Iran to hold talks with the United States and that such talks were important for the security of the 
region.134 Further cooperation should entail the U.S. curtailing is projection of power towards Iran in the 
Persian Gulf, ceasing its calls upon the international community to not invest in Iran, and proactively 
bringing Iran into multilateral endeavors confronting Middle Eastern affairs. As a part of its new 
diplomatic approach, Washington must also encourage stabilizing Iranian influence in bordering states 
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and cease casting an enemy image for Iran with language that labels Iran as a main protagonist in an 
''axis of evil'' or the “central banker of terrorism”. In light of many years of sanctions, containment, and 
inflammatory accusations, the time has come to realize that such measures are wholly incapable of 
moderating Iran's behavior.  
In September 2006, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami criticized both Ahmadinejad 
and President Bush for using intemperate language that has heightened tensions, “A politician must 
conduct himself at the highest level of etiquette and diplomacy.”  On the topics of sanctions and military 
action Khatami went on to state, “Sanctions and, even worse than that, military action will only serve to 
complicate the issue, not solve the problem.” He further indicated that despite the change in the 
leadership, Iran was not the enemy of the United States and that the two countries share strategic 
interests in Iraq and Afghanistan.135 Both Tehran’s moderate voices and history of foreign policy 
practices reveal that the Islamic Republic is quite capable and willing to mitigate its ideology with 
pragmatism.136 
The Bush Administration is facing increasing domestic and international pressure to pursue 
Iranian assistance in pacifying sectarianism in Iraq. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Australian 
Premier John Howard have indicated they favor engaging Iran and Syria in order to develop effective 
measures to reduce the level of violence in Iraq; a stance increasingly shared by many influential U.S. 
lawmakers from both parties.137 By engaging Iran in order to pursue the stabilization of Iraq, the Bush 
Administration could also open additional avenues of dialogue leading to further rapprochement. To 
continue on its quest to halt the sectarian violence only to meet further failure would leave Iran feeling 
more confident and less inclined to assist the United States in minimizing its losses.138 The key to 
Washington freeing itself of the Iraqi quagmire is to do what the current Presidential administration has 
refused to do all along: link Iranian cooperation in Iraq to Washington's willingness to find a 
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compromise on the nuclear issue. Neither Congress nor a pragmatist in charge of the Pentagon is likely 
to change the course on Iraq and Iran unless the President recognizes the reality on the ground: without 
Iran, the U.S. cannot win in Iraq, and without linking Iraq to the nuclear issue, Tehran is not likely to 
cooperate.139 Such compromise with Iran would ultimately serve as the most viable exit strategy from 
Iraq, leaving the door open for future political and economic relations with Tehran. 
 
Opium: Iran and U.S. Interests Converge Again 
The cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan have skyrocketed since the U.S. deposed 
the Taliban in 2001. It is said that Afghanistan now supplies 92 percent of the world’s illicit opium. The 
rapidly expanding opium apparatus now threatens to destabilize the Afghan government and transform 
the embattled country back into sanctuary for drug traffickers and terrorists.140 Drug traffickers have 
characterized Iran as part of the “golden route”, an opium smuggling trail that extends from Afghanistan 
into Pakistan and then into eastern Iran. From Iran opium, and its derivative heroin, ultimately makes its 
way into western markets. Afghanistan’s drug cultivation and trafficking is somewhat pervasive and its 
proceeds also enrich certain elements allied with Washington. A senior U.S. Pentagon official, who has 
been involved in the reorganization of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to effectively pitch them 
against the Taliban, admitted the drug economy in Afghanistan was more powerful than the actual 
economy. However, the route has become a lucrative funding source for the Taliban resistance whose 
other sources of financing have been nearly eliminated due to the “war on terror”.141 
Iran has the highest rate of heroin and opium addiction per capita. According to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC, of Iran's 70 million people more than 4 million are 
addicted to drugs.  This addiction cuts across educational, class, age and economic barriers. Experts 
claim that Middle-aged professionals and academics are as vulnerable as under-educated, socially 
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deprived teenagers. Iran is plagued by the movement of drugs flowing in through its eastern and western 
borders, as well as its southern seaports. Overwhelming quantities of opium and heroin are smuggled in 
from Afghanistan, Pakistan and former Soviet republics such as Turkmenistan. Further exacerbating this 
problem is an influx of hallucinogenic and chemical-based drugs, such as ecstasy, from Turkey and 
through the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. 
Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, more than 2.6 million Iranians have been arrested on drug 
offenses. Almost half the prison population is serving time for drug-related crimes. Iran’s police and 
security forces have been engaged in a losing battle with drug smugglers. In 2003, the country's anti-
drug forces seized 220 tons of drugs, reckoned by the UN to be just a fraction of the amount entering the 
country. Since the revolution, approximately 3,200 members of the security forces have been killed in 
clashes with drug traffickers.142 However Iran is not the only country that has a strong desire to eradicate 
the opium apparatus firmly rooted in Afghanistan.  
In September 2006, the UNODC published a survey on opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 
which it said has risen 59 percent since 2005. The report characterized the 6,100 tons of opium 
harvested in Afghanistan in 2006 as “unprecedented,” and claimed harvest revenues are likely to exceed 
$3 billion. On the heels of the U.N. report, Thomas Schweich of the U.S. State Department issued a 
statement to reporters in Brussels that U.S. officials believe aggressive eradication of opium poppies in 
Afghanistan is crucial. John Waters, the White House drug control policy director, also noted that opium 
poppy eradication endeavors have been successful in Mexico and South America. Both countries have 
been the main suppliers of heroin to the United States. However he indicated that enforcement agencies, 
such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, are concerned that opium emanating from Afghanistan 
may ultimately fill the void.143 
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The void left by the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan is being occupied by 
corrupt officials, criminals, and terrorists. Furthermore, these elements are substantially subsidized by 
the opium trade. The majority of Afghanistan delighted in the Taliban’s fall, however the weak central 
government along with U.S. and NATO forces has been ineffective in establishing security or 
ameliorating the quality of life in Afghanistan. Additionally, errant bullets and bombs have injured and 
killed many innocent Afghans who have become increasingly disillusioned with U.S. and NATO forces. 
Ironically, Afghans are now turning back to the Taliban in order to meet their security needs. The opium 
crop is also a major source of funding for the Taliban insurgency. 
The opium problem and security of Afghanistan are intimately linked and Iran must not be 
precluded from this regional equation. Iran’s cultural, political, and religious clout has earned it a 
position of unrivaled regional prominence. Iran has harbored close to two million Afghans either as 
refugees or illegal immigrants. In addition to supplying Afghanistan electricity, Iran is also actively 
building roads, schools and hospitals within the war-torn country. Iran has clearly made substantial 
investments in Afghanistan. In the past it has offered support and assistance to the Northern Alliance 
and has provided millions of dollars in aid after the toppling of the Taliban. Additionally, as its 
neighbor, Iran has intimate historical and linguistic ties with Afghanistan. Washington has clearly 
benefitted in the past from Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Afghan elements view Shi’ite Iran as an 
ally and are predisposed to accepting Iranian political advice in regional affairs. The reality on the 
ground such as the return of the Taliban, suggests that Washington must abandon its overly ambitious 
goals and reengage Iran. It is important to stress that rapprochement with Iran does not constitute a 
drastic overhaul of Washington’s initial strategy. Co-opting Iran simply reflects Washington’s ultimate 
realization that it must recruit relevant regional players in order to establish a renewed sense of security 
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in Afghanistan. As an alien regional player seeking to effect changes from abroad, the United States 
must reestablish dialogue with Iran and cooperate with it in this important area of mutual interest. 
The opium flow from Afghanistan is addressed by Iran primarily through interdiction. Recently, 
Iran has increased its interdiction efforts, largely because of its increasing domestic addiction problem. 
Iran has also lost several thousand troops in its efforts to guard its porous border with Afghanistan.144 
Iran’s commitment to preventing opium emanating from Afghanistan from reaching its citizens also 
prevents the illicit substance from finding its way into Western markets.  
The interdiction effort has become a dangerous business for Iran. In 2005 more than a quarter of 
the drug seizures in Iran came by way of “armed clashes,” according to the Iranian Drug Control 
Headquarters.  Iranian security forces seem to be having increased success by concentrating their 
interdiction efforts in the eastern provinces. The eastern provinces, specifically the southeast, are among 
the poorest regions in Iran. The population there has made its living by smuggling for many years, even 
prior to the 1979 Revolution.145 Iran pursues an aggressive border interdiction effort and has invested as 
much as $800 million in a system of elaborate counter-trafficking infrastructures such as patrol roads, 
concrete dam constructions, ditches, sentry points, observation towers, barbed wire, electrified fences, 
and even electronic surveillance devices. 30,000 law enforcement personnel man Iran’s borders with 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iran says it spends $400 million annually on anti-drug operations.146 
The United States is equally concerned about the opium emanating from Afghanistan. However, 
its primary role should be that of counter-insurgency and not so much counter-narcotics. Clearly 
Afghanistan lacks a modicum of stability and without widespread security, counter-narcotics measures 
will water down forces and would be hopelessly ineffective. Instability in Afghanistan represents a 
looming danger for the Karzai government whose grip on power is tenuous at best. In the absence of 
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stability, efforts to eradicate the illicit opium apparatus would only lead to adaptation and a strengthened 
insurgency by the Taliban, which continues to dominate remote areas of Afghanistan.  
Eradication and interdiction efforts within Afghanistan, on the part of the United States, are 
accompanied by the risk of political fallout that could lead to more violence and instability. Aerial 
spraying would also kill food crops some farmers plant alongside their poppies. Herbicidal spraying 
could ultimately be characterized, namely by the Taliban, as American chemical warfare against the 
Afghan peasantry. Ironically, officials at the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency have also 
challenged the White House and State Department support for poppy eradication, raising concerns about 
its potential to destabilize the Karzai government, current and former American officials have said.147 
Both Tehran and Washington have a shared interest in combating the illicit opium industry and 
promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Both should provide financial aid, material support and 
training in order to empower the Afghani central government to increase its eradication / interdiction 
capacities as well as its ability to target criminal organizations and corrupt officials. Iran and the United 
States are better equipped to work in unison to address the re-emerging insurgency while allowing the 
Karzai government to police itself domestically.   
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: “Pasdaran” 
The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 
or “Pasdaran”, in 1979. The clerical counterpart to the country's standing armed forces, the Pasdaran is 
the Islamic Republic's principal ideological weapon.148 Although the Iranian Constitution entrusts the 
military with guarding Iran's territorial integrity and political independence, it empowers the Pasdaran to 
guard the integrity of the Iranian Republic’s revolutionary ideology. Specifically, the Pasdaran is to 
assist the ruling clerics with the enforcement of the republic's Islamic codes and morality. The formation 
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of the Pasdaran unified several paramilitary forces into a single force loyal to the new regime. The 
Pasdaran was to function as a counter to the influence and power of the regular military and to disarm 
non-Islamist members of the broad revolutionary coalition. Its sacrifices and gradual adoption of 
classical warfare doctrines during the Iran-Iraq War enhanced its reputation as an efficient military force 
and political influence soon followed. While discussion of the Pasdaran's cultural and religious activities 
remains muted outside narrow academic circles, they are as real as its political activities.149 
The Iranian military is a powerful apparatus which, within the region, is commonly said to be 
second only to Israel. However, the Iranian military is routinely spoken of in the media as a single 
entity; a practice that is wholly inaccurate. Militarily speaking, Iran’s forces are comprised of three 
different elements – the regular armed forces, the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), and the Pasdaran 
(IRGC). Like the Regular Iranian army, the Pasdaran has land, air and navy forces. The Pasdaran is also 
comprised of a missile and special forces arm.  
However the regular military is, in totality, much larger and a better-equipped apparatus than the 
Pasdaran. The regular military is comprised of approximately 400,000 active duty members while the 
Pasdaran has only 120,000. Pasdaran land forces are significantly smaller and less armed than their 
regular army counterparts. The regular army is also better equipped in comparison. The bulk of Iran's 
200 or so operational “high performance” combat aircraft are owned by the regular air force in contrast 
to the Pasdaran’s few dozen trainer aircraft. The Pasdaran navy consists of 10 Chinese Houdong class 
missile boats and more than 100 small boats, shore-based anti-ship missile batteries, and a large combat 
swimmer (naval special warfare) force. Iran’s regular navy controls a dozen major surface combatant 
ships and three submarines. Although relatively small in stature, the Pasdaran is a key institution in Iran 
today due to its role as “guardian of the revolution” and the fact that many senior Pasdaran commanders 
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have close personal and family links to powerful members of Iran's clerical establishment. 
Consequentially, the Pasdaran has assured itself a crucial role in the selection, ideological indoctrination, 
professional development, and advancement of future senior officers.150 Despite their differences, all 
three military arms are under the direction of the Supreme Leader of Iran, who has a representative in 
charge of each of the three arms. This diaspora of military power within Iran is an outgrowth of the 
Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. For obvious reasons, the nascent clerical regime was suspicious of 
the regular armed military which had previously supported the Peacock throne. As a result, the Pasdaran 
were constitutionally entrenched as an ideological counterweight to the regular armed forces. The 
regular army is solely committed to protecting Iranian territory, independence and general order within 
the country. The Pasdaran protect the “purity” of Islamic theology practiced in Iran. 
As the most ideologically committed arm of the Islamic regime not only was the Pasdaran 
established to discourage notions of a future military coup, it has also become one of the main political 
and economic players in the country. In actuality, the Pasdaran has become somewhat of a franchise 
chain rather than a corporation controlled by a board of directors. This aspect of the Pasdaran 
necessitates a sophisticated approach when foreign actors endeavor to engage it. The Pasdaran is divided 
into five commands, each of which has a direct line to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, also one of 
the earliest members of the force in 1980. Of the five commands that make up the Pasdaran, only two 
could be regarded as “terrorist” according to the U.S. State Department’s definition. The first, which 
includes the so-called “Quds” Corps, is responsible for the exportation of the “Islamic Revolution”. 
Apart from Hezbollah and Hamas this command coordinates a number of radical groups across the 
globe. The second command that is radical in nature deals with internal repression. It operates through 
several auxiliary forces, including the notorious “Karbala” brigades charged with crushing popular 
revolts in Tehran. A majority of the Iranian populace perceive these as instruments of terror.151 Parallel 
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to the regular army, the Pasdaran also control the “Basij Mustadafin” (mobilization of the dispossessed), 
a zealously ideological, semi-voluntary force of 90,000 full-time fighters and 2 million reserves. It is 
said this force could be expanded to 11 million according to its commander General Mohammad Hejazi. 
Their role is to combat internal enemies of the revolution and ensure that Islamic law is respected. 
Pasdaran membership is said to stand at approximately 125,000 members. Its officers’ corps, including 
retired members, is comprised of 55,000 individuals who are said to be as divided on domestic and 
foreign policies as the Iranian populace.152 During the course of my field research in Iran, Bita Molkava 
was quick to point out members of the Basij Mustadafin, whom she referred to as “Basijis”. Under the 
control of local mosques, these individuals wore regular clothes and were known to patrol public areas 
monitoring the conduct of Iranians.  Molkova indicated their domestic spying had noticeably increased 
after the election of hardliner President Ahmadinejad. Although Molkova stated she highly favors the 
end of hair covering and other social codes, she cautioned against the notion of immediate change. 
Molkova favored gradual, rather than abrupt change, which she felt would inevitably occur over the 
course of diplomatic relations (political and economic) with the west.153 Mehrdad Hemmatyar also noted 
that containment, sanctions, and harsh rhetoric from the west – namely Washington – had occasioned 
the elections of hardliner figures that ratcheted up enforcement of morality codes. For Hemmatyar, the 
Pasdaran is a tool of the clerical apparatus to prevent Western values from taking root and endangering 
their grip on political power. He too asserted that engagement, rather than abrupt regime change, would 
ultimately lead to the moderation of the clerical apparatus.154 Reactionary in nature, it is surmised the 
Pasdaran would evolve during the course of the moderation of the Islamic Republic. Despite its 
oppressive practices, through the years the Pasdaran has provided Iranians with an effective vehicle not 
only to advance themselves socially, but also economically and politically as well. 
 77
The Pasdaran has established a domineering economic empire that has made it a financially 
independent segment of Iran’s power elite. This empire entails a vast array of financial and economic 
enterprises, from trading corporations to huge public works projects. Following the 1980-88 Iran/Iraq 
war, the Pasdaran was directed to assume control over a majority of the country’s reconstruction. In 
furtherance of the endeavor, the Pasdaran established the “Construction Jihad”. This event enabled the 
Pasdaran to become a formidable actor within the Iranian economic sector. In 1983, the Supreme 
Defense Council authorized the Pasdaran to set up its own military industries. This ended the U.S. 
sponsored monopoly of the regular armed forces over domestic arms production and repair industries. 
Over the course of a few years, the Pasdaran operated a growing defense industry which currently 
produces a vast array of military weapons; from ballistic missiles to automatic rifles. Washington’s arms 
embargos have had the opposite effect, enabling Iran to become increasingly self sufficient. In the face 
of sanctions and embargos, the Pasdaran has actively endeavored to limit the penetration of foreign 
contractors into Iran’s economy, positing that they constitute a security risk or have business dealings 
with Israel. Washington’s containment policies hobbled reformists, such as former President 
Mohammed Khatami who favored opening up the economy to badly needed outside investment during 
the period between 1997 and 2005. The Pasdaran’s widening economic reach can be attributed, for the 
most part, to Washington’s historical aversion to rapprochement with Iran. As a result, the Pasdaran 
have been able to dramatically expand their activities. Through its companies, the Pasdaran has become 
involved in a diverse array of activities, from small road, dam, and tunnel projects to petroleum 
production and major construction projects across the country. 
In 2006, “Khatam al-Anbiya” secured deals worth at least $7 billion in the oil, gas, and 
transportation sectors, among others.155 Said to be the “engineering arm” of the Pasdaran, in June 2007 
“Khatam-al-Anbia” was awarded a $2.09 billion contract to develop the huge South Pars offshore gas 
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field. Around the same period, the Pasdaran was awarded a $1.2 billion contract to construct a 900 
kilometer pipeline linking the South Pars field to southeastern Iran to provide domestic gas. Developing 
the South Pars gas field is a significant economic endeavor that will enable the exploitation of Iran’s 
vast gas reserves. Second on the globe only to Russia’s gas reserves, the Pars development project will 
be Tehran’s money-train as oil reserves are depleted. The Pasdaran’s footprint in South Pars highlights 
its overt penetration into Iran’s sacrosanct energy sector and further broadens its growing political 
power. In addition, the Pasdaran recently procured Iran’s largest private oil company, Oriental Kish, for 
approximately $90 million. Sources indicate the Pasdaran are involved in approximately 250 additional 
projects worth a total of $2.8 billion, including a new port terminal for shipping petrochemicals, while 
1,220 projects worth between $2.7 billion and $3.2 billion have been completed. The impact of the 
Pasdaran’s growing economic power is heightened by the control that the regime’s financial oligarchs, 
dominated by the influential League of Islamic Associations, exert over state and non-state institutions. 
These include a collaborative of powerful semi-government, supposedly philanthropic, foundations 
known as “bonyads”, which control assets worth billions of dollars. These financial reserves have also 
enabled the Pasdaran to allegedly fund covert operations. Its economic brawn has enabled the Pasdaran 
to build up an ideological franchise throughout the republic, which provides funding independent of the 
state.156 
Overtly religious, nationalistic, and battle-trained since 1980, the Pasdaran has emerged as a 
critical force in determining Iran's national security strategy. In a post-Khomeini era, the Pasdaran is 
more often displaying its ability to wield enormous power to approve or disapprove governmental 
changes. Close relations with the highest political authorities have enabled Pasdaran enterprises to win 
lucrative building and other contracts in non-competitive bidding.157 However, Pasdaran officials have 
also utilized their access to the Revolutionary Council and Khomeini as a stepping-stone to higher 
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offices. Both President Khamenei and Majlis speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani were previously commanders 
within the Pasdaran.158 The Pasdaran have been incrementally gathering political power with the passing 
of Ayatollah Khomeini 1989. This activity became especially pronounced when its current commander, 
Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, assumed control in 1997. The Pasdaran’s economic and political 
clout was significantly augmented in June 2005 with the surprise election of the fiery populist Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, a former Pasdaran commander, to the Iranian presidency. Many who are historically 
dependent upon the Pasdaran to maintain political power, such as militant ideologues and conservative 
clerics, operated in roles that were critical to ensuring Ahmadinejad’s election.159 By 2005 the IRGC's 
long reach into political affairs was increasingly apparent. Iran's parliament included about 80 former 
IRGC members, while other former members command the regular army and the national police. Still 
more occupy important civilian and government positions, such as municipal councilors, mayors, 
provincial governors, university professors, and businessmen.160 Through examination of the various 
facets of the Pasdaran, it is evident its elements work under an ideological veil, but truly have both 
political and economic stakes in maintaining and defending the current regime. 
Although ideological by design, many in the Pasdaran have assumed roles within its ranks in 
order to simply acquire a paycheck. Most distinguished Pasdaran commanders can be viewed as 
businessmen, with the distinction as a military figure being merely a ceremonial role. A majority of the 
members have relatives abroad in Europe or North America in order to safeguard business interests and 
maintain congress with foreign “satans” should Tehran eventually fall in an ideological sense. Those 
Pasdaran commanders who found themselves unable to embrace the Islamic Republic's rigid practices 
defected to America. Hundreds of others relegated themselves to a low-profile exile, for the most part as 
businessmen in the UAE, Malaysia and Turkey. Contrary to popular sentiments in the partisan media, 
few Pasdaran commanders, including some in the highest of offices, abhor the notion of hostile relations 
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with America. Should the Pasdaran be forced to engage American troops a true military victory is highly 
unlikely, and protracted conflict with America would damage or utterly destroy lucrative Iranian 
business empires. 
The term “Pasdaran” (vigilantes) evokes a mixture of loathing and grudging admiration. 
Although many Iranians perceive it as a monster protecting an evil regime, most realize that Pasdaran 
leaders are truly pragmatic businessmen who would ultimately side with the populace against an 
increasingly repressive and unpopular clerical regime. It must be noted the Pasdaran was established 
after the Islamic revolution had succeeded; a fact of crucial importance. Those who joined the Pasdaran 
came from a myriad of backgrounds, many being opportunists who signed up on fictitious grounds. 
Membership in the Pasdaran afforded only revolutionary credentials but, most importantly, substantial 
income during a period when economic collapse made stable employment a rarity. Membership in the 
Pasdaran enabled many, especially those who had supported the former regime, to erase their past and 
obtain "revolutionary virginity." An Iranian who joined the Pasdaran obtained access to rare goods and 
services, such as electronics and decent housing. Most importantly, the Pasdaran represented a lifeline 
for many Iranians during uncertain times. For this reason, it would be irresponsible to broadly 
characterize the Pasdaran as a terrorist organization. A blanket labeling of the Pasdaran (IRGC) as 
"terrorist" as opposed to targeting specific elements that terrorize the Iranian people, and others in the 
region and beyond, could prove counterproductive. It may, in fact, unite a fractious force that could 
splinter into more manageable parts given the right incentives.161 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
“We want good relations with the American people. There has to be a dialogue between the 
governments, but what can one do when your government has always wronged us? We need to see 
evidence that this process will be reversed.” 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani – Former President of Iran 
 
Objective examination of the status of relations between Iran and the United States invariably 
leads the unbiased researcher to become somewhat critical of American foreign policy. This research 
has unequivocally revealed that the United States did a great disservice to the nascent democratic forces 
in Iran, beginning with the CIA lead disposal of Mossadegh.  As the chief architect of American foreign 
policy, U.S. presidents determine the warmth of relations with the exterior world. Examination of 
foreign policy crafted by previous presidential administrations establishes that barriers to U.S. / Iranian 
rapprochement are raised between the two countries at the individual level. Previous administrations 
have seemingly remained fixated on the international milieu as an ideological arena characterized only 
by “win or lose” outcomes. All dissonance in this realm is viewed by Washington ideologues solely 
through the prism of “good versus evil” confrontation. By virtue of its wealth and military might, 
Washington has claimed for itself the role as the consummate force for good.  Consequently, states or 
entities not firmly entrenched in Washington’s camp are characterized as enemies to be confronted and 
expatriated from the international collective if they dare not acquiesce. Because Tehran has displayed 
the temerity to resist Washington with increasing levels of success, Iran has been labeled as dangerous. 
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During the course of my tour of the Islamic Republic, I found myself within a western oriented 
country whose citizenry powerfully craves higher levels of freedom and engagement with the western 
world. Although Iran is situated between two worn-torn, underdeveloped states and is besieged by 
sanctions and an American containment policy, the Iranian populace is highly educated and Iran’s major 
cities are modern in every sense of the word. Iranian women lead productive lives, routinely pursue 
graduate level educations, and are noticeably coddled by their male counterparts. The Islamic 
government, its hardliner figures, and the rigidity of the apparatus are indeed no reflection of the Iranian 
society. Pro-American sentiment is rampant amongst Iranians and unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
Iranian people are absolutely prepared for American style democracy.  
My experience in Iran confirmed my suspicion that Washington’s history of economic sanctions 
and policy of containment have been not only ineffective but also counterproductive. Evidently 
Washington does not have a clear understanding of the Islamic Republic and has reacted aggressively 
rather than pragmatically. Iran is a country whose younger population and future leaders are in the 
majority. This up and coming segment also views the west, specifically America, quite favorably and 
would welcome engagement. Iran’s economic future is also uncertain and its current political leadership 
is extremely unpopular. However Washington’s lack of engagement and vilification of Iran in general 
serves only to allow leaders such as Ahmadinejad to rouse nationalistic sentiment and pursue bellicose 
policies. By ending hostile rhetoric and engaging Iran piecemeal across a plethora of issues, Washington 
could easily garner the domestic political support necessary in Iran to occasion positive outcomes. At 
this juncture, there are no longer nuclear possibilities in Iran; there are inevitabilities. The circumstances 
dictate extensive engagement in order to assure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear intentions. An 
Islamic Republic engaged politically and economically with the U.S. would be certainly less inclined to 
pursue a nuclear weapons program and would assist in stabilization efforts in its bordering states. 
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Individual Level Implications 
Eisenhower’s Legacy 
A pervasive dearth of awareness with regard to the history of U.S. / Iranian relations plagues the 
American populace. Mohammad Mossadegh, a colossal figure in Iranian history and Time magazine’s 
1951 “Man of the Year”, and his fate at the hands of the CIA are virtually unknown in well-educated 
circles of modern America. For this reason, ideologues in Washington are able to demonize Iran while 
paying lip service to the notion of democracy. Not widely acknowledged is the fact that the United 
States was responsible for eliminating democratic rule in Iran in 1953; subsequently installing a long-
standing dictatorial regime. U.S. administration officials have been successful in vilifying Iran by 
tactically elucidating particular events subsequent to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. However, it is U.S. 
foreign policy prior to the Islamic Revolution that continues to stir negative Iranian sentiments. 
Americans who fail to understand the Iranian animus towards Washington need only look into the 
actions of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1953. By overthrowing Iran’s democratic government, the 
Eisenhower Administration irrevocably changed the political culture; in effect imposing upon Iranians 
the rigid elements of life they endure today. Not only were the healthy crops of democracy extirpated in 
Iran, a dictatorial monarch replaced a revered political figure who embraced the United States as a 
reliable sponsor and an ideological ally.  The Eisenhower Administration’s fingerprint in Iran 
dramatically changed the manner in which most of the international community viewed America. 
Eisenhower’s legacy is an unromantic communication from the past warning policymakers of the 
dangers of effecting far-reaching changes in distant nations. For this reason, architects of American 
foreign policy who seek to gain compliance from Iran must be cognizant of historical realities that have 
great bearing upon the Iranian mindset. Primarily, they must refrain from repeating the mistakes of their 
predecessors and avoid subordinating notions of national sovereignty and democracy to pecuniary 
motives. 
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Carter’s Miscalculations 
There are several lessons to be learned from the miscalculations of the Carter Administration. 
Although admirable, Carter’s apparent obsession with the notion of human rights veered his presidential 
decision making well outside the realm of political pragmatism. Domestically, Shah Pahlavi had 
alienated himself, operating a repressive dictatorial regime with a secret police force infamous for 
committing acts of torture. However Pahlavi’s methods assured his regime’s foothold and had little to do 
with his fall from power. Despite his despotic shortcomings, Pahlavi had normalized relations with the 
West, recognized the state of Israel, and publicly accorded women equal status in Iranian society. 
Because Pahlavi’s was forced make broad rather than incremental steps toward political freedom, radical 
elements in Iran were left unfettered to establish a revolutionary powder keg in Iran. Carter’s subsequent 
termination of funding that assuaged the enmity of outspoken anti-Western mullahs lit the match. Faced 
with the choice of either backing the Shah or working with revolutionary elements to attenuate the 
violence associated with transition to the new government Carter remained indecisive. After the new 
revolutionary regime had come to power, Carter again allowed his humanitarian heart-strings to prevail 
over pragmatism by admitting the Shah into the U.S. for medical treatment, stoking the anger of a 
younger radicalized Iranian element; thus placing U.S. diplomats in Iran at their mercy. Enabled by 
Carter’s humanitarian naïveté, the new regime also put thousands of so-called spies, informants, and 
pro-Western Iranians to death by firing squads. Iranian women were again forced to wear conservative 
attire and a once free media fell under rigid government scrutiny. A government that was once amenable 
to Washington was replaced by an intractable regime utterly antagonistic towards the United States. Had 
the Carter Administration not abandoned Shah Pahlavi and sought progressive change incrementally, it 
is axiomatic the mullahs of Iran would not be in control today. Unfortunately for the Iranian people, 
President Carter was an idealist and not a statesman. Although good intentioned, Carter failed to 
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recognize Iran for the intricate political puzzle that it is. Carter’s miscalculations represent a great lesson 
for future policymakers. Much like with George W. Bush’s endeavor in Iraq, presidential 
administrations should consider the possible consequences associated with abruptly terminating the 
repression of certain dissident elements in sovereign countries. The scheme of American freedom has 
not yet proven to be universal, namely in countries where it is culturally and religiously incompatible. 
Fostering abrupt widespread political freedom has more often produced violent undercurrents with 
proven global implications. The forcing of Pahlavi’s hand, much like the toppling of Mossadegh and 
Saddam Hussein, was not a process that had positive implications with regard to freedom and 
humanitarianism. All were processes that resulted in chaotic or more repressive environments. Even in 
America, progressive and enduring change occurred incrementally with leadership and the citizenry 
laboring in concert with one another. The endeavor to effect positive change abroad should be an 
endeavor approached with trepidation.  Carter failed to consider the possible consequences his demands 
would have upon the stability and continuity of governance in Iran. When confronted with their ultimate 
reality, Carter was ponderously indecisive and set the stage for the emergence of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. The nascent clerical regime in Tehran and its pugnacious Shah acutely sensed Carter’s affable 
nature; subsequently emboldened by their ability to flout his courteous requests with apparent impunity. 
Although Pahlavi ran a repressive regime, Iran was still laboring towards democracy and Carter failed to 
recognize the importance of incremental change during the course of Iran’s tumultuous political 
development. The lesson in Carter’s case is that Washington should have a more thorough 
understanding of the political milieu within a particular country before encouraging or compelling it to 
make broad political reforms. 
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Reagan’s Duplicity 
Although revered amongst conservative ideologues, Reagan’s presidency will be forever 
foreshadowed by two rather damaging foreign policy blunders; the arming of the Hussein regime with 
chemical weapons and the Iran-Contra Affair. Siding with Hussein against Iran revealed that the Reagan 
Administration evidently wished to relegate the Middle East to a globally innocuous group of warring 
states incapable of resisting U.S. foreign policy endeavors. The Reagan Administration only further 
alienated the U.S. from Iran and ultimately further empowered a murderous despot the United States 
would itself engage militarily in the future. Furthermore, Reagan’s denial of any knowledge regarding 
an Iran-Contra affair framed him as a confused and uninformed executive whose lethargic managerial 
paradigm hampered his ability to control rogue subordinates. While circumventing congressional 
prerogatives, the Reagan Administration operated under a majorly flawed assumption. This being the 
notion that “moderate” Iranian elements somehow exercised complete control over Hezbollah.  No one 
can fault the Reagan Administration for attempting to negotiate with Iran in order to secure the release 
of American hostages.  However, the administration can be righteously castigated for over $50 million 
in illegal arms sales to Iran, betrayal of the standing U.S. policy to never make concessions to terrorist 
elements, and its subsequent duplicity upon the revelation of its illegal conduct. Sadly, at the end of 
Reagan’s time in office, there were more kidnapped Americans in Lebanon at the end of Reagan's arms-
for-hostages endeavor than there were at the outset. In retrospect, the Reagan Administration clearly 
made a mistake in siding with Hussein against Iran. Additionally, Iran clearly exploited the hostage 
event to its benefit. Iran evidently drew the Reagan Administration into an illicit arms deal with the 
intention of eventually leaking the arrangement in order to humiliate the United States before the 
international community. However, openly challenging Iran to control its proxies and waging an 
effective campaign to rescue America hostages would have vitiated the Reagan Administration’s 
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clandestine endeavors in Nicaragua. Coupled with the actions of his predecessors, Reagan exited office 
leaving Washington with no other alternative than a reversal of America foreign policy towards Iran if it 
hopes to garner a token amount of credibility in the Middle East. 
George H.W. Bush’s Missed Opportunity 
George H.W. Bush entered office during a period of significant change in Iran. After Khomeini’s 
death, Ali Khameinei had taken the grand clerical helm and Rafsanjani had been elected as president. 
Strongly aligned with the Iranian business class Rafsanjani was, and remains, antagonistic towards 
Islamic ideologues in Iran such as the current president - Ahmadinejad. As a pragmatic conservative, 
Rafsanjani is a domestic centrist and an international moderate who strives to avoid conflict and 
improve Iran’s relations with the United States. In hindsight, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and 
subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq was a salient window of opportunity for George H.W. Bush to reach 
out to Rafsanjani in order to pave the initial path towards rapprochement. Rafsanjani publicly 
condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq; however Iran also 
remained noticeably neutral as U.S. forces marched into Iraq. Bush also did well to assert publicly that 
the U.S. presence in the Middle East was indeed temporary and that its forces would depart once the 
Kuwaiti crisis had been averted. Although enduring a firestorm of domestic criticism for leaving 
Saddam in power Bush made good on his promise. With the American objective achieved, U.S. troops 
were pulled from Iraq leaving its military substantially crippled. After a decade of severed diplomatic 
relations, the hostile rhetoric between Tehran and Washington had also subsided. To his defense, Bush 
was also at the helm during a period when Washington’s focus was global and the U.S.S.R. was in its 
death throes. However the Bush Administration seemingly ignored an opportunity to re-establish 
relations with a country that, in Saddam’s weakened state, had the regional balance of power tipped in 
its favor. With a common enemy hobbled, there was at this time an opportunity to engage Iran 
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diplomatically in order to further contain the Hussein regime. Rafsanjani was extremely motivated to 
revive Iran's badly flagging economy on the basis of free-market principles. For this reason he signaled 
his desire to improve relations with the West, gradually reopen the country to foreign investment, and 
reestablish Iran as a regional power. After a protracted period of soured relations, the Bush 
Administration stood in a position to abandon the sticks and bring Iran galloping back into the fold with 
merely a hand full of carrots. Rafsanjani's support for renewed relations with America and his free-
market economic policies stand in stark contrast with those of Ahmadinejad and his counterparts who 
are absolutely unwilling to capitulate to the West. Bush’s missed opportunity with regard to the Iran of 
his time brings to mind the sage advice of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, “You could not step twice 
into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you.” That an opportunity was lost is not in 
question. That it remains lost forever is dependent upon the ingenuity of America’s future statesmen. 
Clinton’s Contrasts 
It wasn’t until almost 50 years after Mossadegh’s demise that a U.S. presidential administration 
formally acknowledged the great disservice the Eisenhower Administration had visited upon the people 
of Iran.  To his credit, President Clinton appeared to be genuinely compelled to seek reconciliation with 
Iran. Clinton conceded that American officials had injudiciously deposed a democratically elected 
figure, installed an authoritarian Shah, and had effectively eliminated parliamentary democracy in Iran. 
Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, also acknowledged that the removal of Mossadegh 
was a setback for Iranian political development and that it was evident that this intervention in Iran’s 
internal affairs still fostered negative feelings towards America. Yet despite these conciliatory 
sentiments, the demonization of Iran soared to new heights under Clinton’s watch producing two 
Presidential Executive Orders (Iranian investment embargos) and the Iran-Lybia Sanctions Act (ILSA). 
But why would an administration that genuinely empathized with the plight of the Iranian people 
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promulgate additional sanctions that further exacerbated their predicament? Clinton faced a Republican 
controlled Congress willing to accommodate well moneyed special interest groups who sought to hobble 
unpopular governments such as Iran. The Clinton Administration was willing to bow to congressional 
initiatives in return for support of his domestic agenda. Furthermore, sanctions were also less expensive 
and not as unsavory to the Clinton Administration as foreign military intervention. The U.S. had also at 
one point pressured Germany not to supply Iran with a nuclear reactor while the U.S was still importing 
a substantial amount of oil from Iran. The sanctions quelled criticism from the E.U. and showed that the 
U.S. was willing to operate consistently with its Iranian containment policies. Persistent pressure from 
the Republican Congress, coupled with lobbying from the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) – the main Jewish lobby in Washington, also caused the Clinton Administration to act further 
against Iran via ILSA.  
ISLA alone has alienated the United States from some of its European allies and has neither 
ended Iranian support of Palestinian groups nor ended Iran’s pursuit of nuclear development. The 
Clinton Administration should have expanded upon its desire to reconcile with Iran, reminding Congress 
and Americans that from a geopolitical standpoint Iran is the central cohesive element necessary for any 
successful endeavor in the Middle East – as recent occurrences would prove. The Clinton 
Administration might have done well to publicly side with major U.S. oil companies and assert that 
active engagement, rather than containment, would yield not only economic rewards but also substantial 
political dividends. President Khatami, a moderate Iranian politician, had signaled that economic 
investment was the key to further political dialogue. Had trade and investment been established between 
Iran and the U.S. under Clinton’s watch, political dialogue would have arguably expanded at an 
exponential rate. Surely this notion is what inspired the EU to establish dialogue and bilateral relations 
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with Iran in defiance of ILSA. Unfortunately, Washington once again began to fall prey to the notion of 
regime change, in lieu of dialogue, as a remedy for Tehran’s defiance.   
George W. Bush’s Bellicosity 
By characterizing Khatami as “weak and ineffective” and signing the ILSA extension, the Bush 
Administration revealed that their oil roots were no match for Washington’s hardliner elements and 
AIPAC. Although the 9/11 attacks briefly transformed Iran in the Bush’s Administration’s Middle 
Eastern conceptual framework, that honeymoon phase proved to be rather ephemeral in the face of 
powerful special interests. Bush’s “axis of evil” rhetoric substantially hobbled moderate elements in Iran 
and arguably fomented the nationalistic sentiment that swept Iranian hardliner Ahmadinejad into office. 
The current stalemate between Tehran and Washington is clearly a battle of wills between ideologues on 
both sides. However it is evident that both executives suffered a loss in domestic popularity as a result of 
their hubris and obstinacy.  
With regard to the Iranian puzzle, the Bush Administration has leaned far too heavily upon the 
threat of a “military option”, which unfortunately still cannot be characterized as a successful policy in 
either Afghanistan or Iraq. Ironically, intervention in Afghanistan yielded its best results when Iranian 
influence was added to the equation. The Bush Administration erred greatly in snubbing the Iranians 
after their benevolence during the course of the establishment of the Afghan interim government. Had 
the Administration recognized its political boon and expanded Iranian involvement throughout its field 
of operations in the Middle East, it could be reasonably surmised that Iran’s cultural and political 
influence would have enhanced the overall efficacy of the U.S. endeavors in Iraq. The Bush 
Administration should have also realized that Washington’s containment gambit had no hope of success 
in a scenario where other power players such as China, the European Union, and Russia were 
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successfully pursuing diplomacy and economic engagement. Washington’s economic sanctions and 
military threats are clearly not succeeding due to the fact that other nations have rationally recognized 
Iran’s geopolitical significance and have seen fit to draw Iran into their orbit. Iran is not the petulant 
entity the Bush Administration would have had the world believe. Washington should have long ago 
perceived Iran as it occurs to other world actors – a nation-state with much needed natural resources and 
substantial regional clout that is equally capable of skillfully pursuing its own interests in the 
international realm. With the Bush chapter fast coming to a close, there is a lesson to be learned from his 
Administration’s paradigm. The re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Iran will not occur in an 
atmosphere of threats or without conciliatory gestures.  
In a geopolitical sense, Iran and the United States have always been natural allies pursuing the 
same goals. This individual level examination has unequivocally produced a salient political imperative. 
Washington must realize that Iran stands poised to play a vital role in stabilizing the Middle East. This 
course of action can be realized via the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Iran through trade, 
economic engagement, and security guarantees. Rapprochement with Iran is the only logical solution to 
ameliorating the current milieu of hostility. 
  
State Level Implications 
Terrorism, Iranian sponsorship of militant groups as well as their pursuit of a nuclear program 
are amongst the most compelling reasons for Washington to engage in meaningful dialogue with 
Tehran. The future of rapprochement with Iran should fundamentally occur in two phases. The first 
being cooperation in areas of mutual concern. The second phase would involve the utilization of the 
trust gained during the course of the strategic partnership to tailor undesirable Iranian conduct; namely 
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its sponsorship of Palestinian resistance groups and its nuclear intentions. Examination of the matter 
from this viewpoint presents a compelling argument as to why Washington and Tehran should cooperate 
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.  
Terrorism 
This research has revealed that Iranian influence served Washington well in Afghanistan against 
the Taliban, and would have further bulwarked its efforts to curtail the actions of al-Qaeda operatives 
had members of the Bush Administration elected to do so. It is important to realize that regional terrorist 
organizations, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, are not only of concern to the United States. In addition 
to Iran, their presence and actions are of extreme concern to China, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey 
as well as a host of other regional actors. It is important for Washington to recognize that in order to 
effectively engage the Taliban and al-Qaeda it can no longer afford to pursue uni-dimensional policies. 
By clinging to its ineffective containment policy, Washington unwittingly contravenes its other regional 
endeavors. Iran is demonstrating that it is increasingly able to counter Washington by aligning itself with 
other world powers; namely China and Russia. Additionally, Iran has recently cooperated with Turkey 
against Kurdish rebel groups. By engaging and working in concert with an increasing list of U.S. allies 
in areas of mutual concern, Tehran is additionally lessening the popularity of U.S. economic sanctions. 
Cooperation with Iran against regional terror groups makes complete geopolitical sense. It could also 
possibly lead to wider terrorism cooperatives with countries such as China and Russia that would enable 
U.S. foreign policy to be conducted through mutually-reinforcing institutions. 
Prior to the “axis of evil” speech, Iran willingly put aside its animus and cooperated with the 
United States in Afghanistan. As a result the Taliban was deposed, al-Qaeda forces were put to rout, and 
an interim democratic government was established. Now that Tehran and Washington are no longer 
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cooperating, it is said that nearly half of Afghanistan is again plagued by Taliban resurgence, al-Qaeda 
elements, and an aggressive militant group under the control of radical Islamic leader Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar. Cooperation with Iran lead to success after September 11th and arguably further success 
could be realized via active re-engagement. Iran’s cultural and political influence clearly had a 
stabilizing effect in Afghanistan. Therefore it stands to reason that rapprochement would visit the same 
results in Lebanon, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and quite possibly the broader Middle East. Iran and the 
United States have common enemies – the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Continued friction between Tehran 
and Washington only weakens their regional effectiveness and benefits their common enemies. As 
posited by noted Iran scholar Rouhollah K. Ramazani, an American-Iranian partnership against al-Qaeda 
will not signal the end to Iraqi or Afghani problems. However, such collaboration will be a vital move 
towards stabilizing both countries, a vision desired by reasonable people worldwide.162 
Revolution Exportation 
Although Tehran clearly cooperated with Washington to depose the Taliban and engage al-
Qaeda elements in Afghanistan, its actions earned it no relief from incessant U.S. claims that it actively 
sponsors state terrorism. Tehran’s support of militant groups, namely Hezbollah, is largely explained by 
its perception of its geostrategic milieu. In addition to supporting Hezbollah for ideological and 
humanitarian reasons, Tehran has utilized Hezbollah as a tool to confront external elements that it 
perceives as a national security threat; specifically Israel and the United States.  
With no expectation of peace in the Middle East on the horizon, coupled with calls for “regime 
change” from Washington, Tehran logically perceives it is facing the peril of military confrontation. In 
the face of U.S. sanctions and hostile rhetoric, the Islamic Republic will not likely alter its current 
relationship with Hezbollah. Additionally, Iran is currently experiencing a salient strategic quandary. It 
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is beset on its northern and southern borders by an ardent wall of U.S. occupation with Israel nearby; a 
reality that surely exacerbates Tehran’s ever-growing perception of being under siege by Washington. 
Although labeled a terrorist organization, Hezbollah is nowhere near the destructive threat that 
al-Qaeda represents. Furthermore, radical figureheads such as Usama bin Laden have clearly 
demonstrated their bellicose and uncompromising natures. Conversely, leaders in Hezbollah have 
expressed a willingness to compromise and possibly commit to an Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese peace 
agreement. Hezbollah’s increasing efficacy also does not emanate from its paramilitary nature. 
Hezbollah has achieved prominence and stability by functioning as a political and social welfare 
organization as well. This evolution has allowed Hezbollah to ultimately occupy a conventional role in 
Lebanese politics.  
As Tehran perceives that it is under threat, it is unlikely that the Islamic Republic will consider 
altering the fundamental nature of its support to Hezbollah. However, as of April 2005 Iran had 
systematically removed virtually all of its forces from Lebanon. Additionally, even if Iran discontinued 
all financial and logistical support Hezbollah would not cease to exist. As a social welfare organization 
and a political party, Hezbollah has moderated its militant Islamic orientation enabling itself to seek 
longevity as a member of the Lebanese political arena. Hezbollah and Iran have also broadened their 
political relationships in Lebanon. This evolving relationship suggests rather clearly that Hezbollah is no 
longer seeking to mimic Iran’s establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Overall, Iran’s 
relationships in Lebanon are more of an endeavor to seek an accommodating neighbor rather than the 
exportation of its revolution. By ending its antagonistic projections of power and limiting its 
involvement in Lebanon to diplomatic engagement, Iran has demonstrated that it is prepared to play a 
constructive role in the Middle East peace process. 
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Nuclear Power 
Evidently it is not common knowledge in America that Iran is among the 189 signatories of the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970; indefinitely extended in 1995. 
Among the three major “pillars” of the NPT is the right of signatory states to peacefully utilize nuclear 
technology. In addition to discouraging the development of nuclear weapons it also requires nations to 
reduce their nuclear weapon stockpiles. Ironically, while demonizing Iran for its nuclear endeavors the 
United States is currently in violation of the reduction provision of the NPT. That Washington has 
refused to engage Iran in any form of direct negotiations with regard to its nuclear ambitions is surely 
the impetus for Tehran’s 2005 declaration to remain undeterred in exercising its right to enrich uranium 
for peaceful purposes. 
Washington’s double standard of criticizing Iran's nuclear program while tolerating Israel’s 
possession of nuclear weapons also prevents it from vilifying Iranian conduct with any modicum of 
legitimacy. Known to possess nuclear weapons with the ability to deploy them by air, land and sea, 
Israel has also labored diplomatically, militarily, and covertly to forestall other regional actors from 
developing nuclear capabilities. Despite its policy of nuclear opacity Israel has yet to be targeted with 
the same vitriol as Iran. Situated in a region that is fundamentally at odds with it, Israel has logical 
reasons for pursuing nuclear capabilities. However, it is an equally rational endeavor for Tehran to 
pursue capabilities that effectively counterbalance those of whom they perceive as a hostile neighbor. 
Clearly Tehran initially concealed its uranium enrichment activities. However, unlike Israel, Iran is a 
signatory state of the NPT that agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons development and has committed 
itself to full cooperation and transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).   
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Although nuclear technology will not completely resolve Iran’s energy issues, it apparently 
pursues nuclear technology also for security and the prestige associated with such an accomplishment. 
Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear development is intimately intertwined with its need for security. Not only is 
Iran situated close to a nuclear Israel, it has been routinely assailed by notions of “regime change” by a 
powerful country whose armed forces have deposed the ruling regimes in neighboring states. 
Allegations of a dangerous weapons program served as the justification for the elimination of the 
Hussein regime in Iraq. Similar accusations have been made against the clerical regime in Iran, therefore 
it is rather apparent why its leaders have embraced an unyielding stance on the nuclear issue. 
This research suggests that Washington must accept the inevitability of a nuclear Iran. Had 
Washington expanded upon the success experienced during the course of working together with Iran in 
Afghanistan, there might have been a chance to discourage Iran from uranium enrichment altogether. 
However, that opportunity no longer exists. At this point, direct engagement of Iran by Washington in 
order to assure the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program may be viewed askance by Tehran. 
Washington would better serve its interests by working in concert with its European allies to tailor the 
Iranian nuclear program while offering incentives such as technological / economic assistance, and most 
importantly the incremental lifting of sanctions.  
 
System Level Implications 
A recurring notion throughout this paper is that Iran and the United States are very much natural 
allies in the Middle East making the diplomatic chill all the more politically irrational. Paradoxically, 
Tehran and Washington find themselves common enemies of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as the 
most steadfast foreign supporters of the Kurdish-Shi’ite political axis that surfaced in the post-invasion 
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Iraqi government. It remains undeniable that Washington and Tehran are very much strategic allies with 
respect to Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, Iran stands poised to play a crucial stabilizing role within 
its own neighborhood. The mutual pursuit of regional stability is also an endeavor threatened by illicit 
narcotics. The trafficking of illicit narcotics remains one of the most serious threats to the stability and 
security of Afghanistan being that they are a primary funding source for the re-emerging Taliban. Opium 
emanating from Afghanistan has caused a serious addiction crisis in Iran, and according to the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) may ultimately fill the void created by successful poppy eradication 
endeavors in Mexico and South America. Finally, Washington has created yet another problem for itself 
by its blanket labeling of the Pasdaran (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. It is clear that the Pasdaran 
was initially founded to safeguard the integrity of the Iranian Islamic establishment and prevent a 
military coup. However the Pasdaran has morphed into a huge military and economic conglomerate, 
with tentacles reaching into all the major state organizations. It has also widely integrated itself into 
Iran’s oil industry, construction, and other key sectors. Yet, its compartmentalized aspect represents an 
opportunity for Washington to moderate Iran incrementally via economic engagement. This final 
examination at the system level elucidates the necessity for Washington to engage Iran economically 
and politically in order to realize some of the more important goals of the modern age. What stands to be 
gained is the attenuation of regional insurgency in the Middle East, an ally in the global war on drugs, 
and the end of hostility between Washington and Tehran through engagement of some of the less 
ideological components of the Iranian Islamic apparatus. 
Afghanistan / Iraq 
This research clearly indicates that Iran’s assistance is vital in the reestablishment of stability 
within Afghanistan and Iraq. Not one of Afghanistan’s or Iraq’s neighboring states have demonstrated 
that they are as willing and effective as the Islamic Republic has been before and during the course of 
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the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Both countries are well within the orbit of Iranian influence with 
Washington acutely sensing it during the course of the U.S. occupations. Iran has and continues to 
maintain a strong political and economic presence in southern Afghanistan. By virtue of an 8-year war 
with Iraq and an enduring religious connection with its Shi’ite inhabitants, Iran is also quite familiar 
with the political landscape and its actors as well. As coreligionists, the Shi’ite populations of both 
countries routinely look upon Iran with a more favorable disposition than their other neighbors. Tehran’s 
political and religious influence in both states is grander in significance than its alleged interference that 
is supposedly hampering Washington’s military and political efficacy. Despite all the hostile rhetoric, 
Iran avidly seeks to assume its rightful role in the stabilization of its neighboring states. Further 
obstinacy on Washington’s part will surely exacerbate the milieu of violence and instability plaguing 
these besieged states.  
Ironically, despite the lingering animus, the U.S. led invasions and subsequent occupations of 
Afghanistan and Iraq are a boon to Iran. Iran’s ominous security threats, the Taliban and Saddam 
Hussein, were removed from power at no expense to Tehran. However, the time has come for 
Washington to change its strategy and align itself with one of the most important players in the region – 
Iran. Prudence dictates that the roadmap to success in the arena of regional stability and an enduring 
peace involves Tehran’s influence.  Washington, as well as the American taxpayer, can no longer afford 
to ignore the region’s most important power player. Much like its allies, Washington must pragmatically 
engage Tehran directly in pursuit of mutual goals. This by no means suggests that Washington must 
countenance an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. Simply stated, active dialogue and cooperation in 
areas of mutual concern will serve to attenuate the milieu of antagonism and open the door to 
negotiations on more controversial matters. 
The suggested change in Washington’s regional strategy is not a form of surrender or retreat as 
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posited by certain political theorists. It is merely the recognition of salient regional realities. From a 
logical standpoint, Washington simply has no other viable alternative; a notion Iran must be increasingly 
aware of. Two major regional realities with regard to Iran’s significance in regional affairs have 
elucidated the impractical nature of Washington’s current policies. The first being the Karzai 
government’s routine highlighting of Iran’s stabilizing hand in Afghanistan. The second being the al-
Maliki government (Iraq) calling for an expansion of security talks between Washington and Tehran. 
Stable governance and the absence of violence in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the key to regional 
stability. Therefore it can be reasonably surmised that this goal can be realized via an alteration of 
American foreign policy towards Iran.  
The Iranian containment policy clearly impedes some of Washington’s most important regional 
endeavors. By abandoning such tactics and recognizing Iran as a worthy regional player to be 
pragmatically engaged, Washington will surely realize a plethora of short and long-term goals. By 
drawing Iran into the mix, American and Iranian interests in Iraq and Afghanistan will no longer be 
perceived to be in opposition to one another. Should all major goals be realized, it would also ultimately 
facilitate the graceful extraction of U.S. military forces from the region as well.  No matter what course 
of action Washington elects to pursue in the short-term, the turmoil within Iraq and Afghanistan will 
ultimately dragoon Washington into negotiations with Iran. It is then that Washington will finally 
recognize Iran’s legitimacy as a regional player, which shares numerous mutual regional concerns. Over 
time this cooperation will pave the road to constructive negotiation over Iran’s nuclear intentions and 
establish a broader framework within which the historical discord between Tehran and Washington can 
be effectively mitigated. 
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War on Drugs 
 There has been a paucity of success in the abatement of the enormous opium crop in southern 
Afghanistan, a location still menaced by a resurgent Taliban. This research has shown that despite the 
presence of American troops in Afghanistan, opium production has increased exponentially. The 
smuggling of opium into Iran is the first leg of a journey that ferries the drug to Western markets. 
Currently, Afghanistan produces the bulk of the global opium supply and approximately half of this 
supply flows through Iran. This reality would make cooperation with Iran in the war on Afghani opium 
exports mutually rewarding.  
 Because thousands of Iranian police have perished during the course of violent confrontations 
with armed drug traffickers, there is substantial evidence that Iran is somewhat committed to stemming 
the flow of drug from Afghanistan into its land and beyond. The west has also found it extremely 
difficult to abate opium farming in remote areas of Afghanistan due in large part to the Taliban, who 
finances their operations via taxation of opium farmers. Cooperation with Iran in the area of opium 
abatement would ultimately align Washington and Tehran against a common enemy – the Taliban. If 
Washington also administered economic and material aid to Iran during the course of its domestic battle 
against drugs, that aid could also be used as leverage to tailor Tehran’s policies in other areas. Currently, 
unilateral sanctions prevent Washington from providing Iran aid in its battle against drugs. However 
several European states continue to contribute aid via the United Nations in this regard. Although 
millions have been raised by European states to assist Iran in its domestic battle against drug trafficking, 
that amount still represents a mere fraction of what the United States has invested into Afghanistan in 
order to discourage opium farming. Despite Washington’s substantial investments since 2001, opium 
production has proliferated. The current administration’s “go it alone” approach has proved not only to 
be ineffective but also overwhelmingly expensive. 
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 The war on illicit narcotics is a global affair and can’t be effectively addressed without 
international cooperation. By operating through multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, 
Washington would arguably realize numerous goals at a substantially discounted rate. Cooperation with 
Tehran in this regard, as well as many others, is neither an admission of defeat nor a special favor. Such 
cooperation would facilitate the accomplishment of a plethora of Washington’s regional goals and set 
the stage for amicable negotiations on more controversial matters. 
 The Taliban had previously proscribed opium production in Afghanistan. However, due to the 
U.S. led invasion the Taliban and opium production have now become intimately intertwined. Opium 
farming has become the livelihood of farmers in remote areas of Afghanistan. The Taliban in turn taxes 
opium farmers and utilizes the proceeds to finance its resistance against the military occupation and the 
new Afghan government. This nexus demands both a comprehensive and multilateral approach with Iran 
as one of the main protagonists. If Washington singlehandedly focuses upon poppy eradication in 
Afghanistan it risks uniting the farmers and other fractious elements with the Taliban, making the 
contentment of this state next to impossible.  
Yet, research suggests that counter-narcotics operations are a regional affair and not a business 
Washington should directly involve itself it. Washington should limit itself to economic and material 
support while focusing primarily upon engaging the mutual enemy – the Taliban. By providing 
economic and material support to Kabul and Tehran in their battle against the narcotic apparatus, 
Washington will enable them to engage a network that finances the Taliban insurgency. As a benefactor 
in the regional war on drugs, Washington will enable itself to focus more upon one if its primary goals – 
the elimination of the Taliban insurgency. 
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 Pasdaran 
As indicated previously, the Pasdaran was established as a security measure for the purposes of 
defending the ideological purity of the Islamic Republic. However, abreast of the Pasdaran is a 
correlative economic base which enabled the organization to become financially independent. The 
Pasdaran’s ability to forgo state funding also allows it to remain committed to its objectives despite any 
changes in the country’s political hierarchy. The Pasdaran’s tentacles of influence have continued to 
entrench themselves deeper as former operatives retired from military offices to become business men 
and members of the state bureaucracy. The intimate nexus between the state bureaucratic apparatus, 
business community, and military-police forces have in essence afforded the Pasdaran a modicum of 
domestic sovereignty. The Pasdaran’s financial and political ascendency stems from its substantial 
holdings and a plexus of internal relations within Iran. A conglomerate of sorts, the Pasdaran has 
become a redoubtable economic and political force to be reckoned with in Iran.  
This research suggests a nexus between Washington’s growing criticism of Iran, namely the 
Pasdaran, and its Sunni allies alarm regarding the anchoring of Shi’a influence in Iraq. Arguably Saudi 
Arabia is concerned about the security and political vacuum resulting from the U.S. lead invasion which 
has created an opportunity for Iran to gain a larger regional foothold. It is becoming increasingly 
apparent the Pasdaran has sponsored armed Shi’a elements in Iraq in order to afford these elements a 
significant advantage over the opposition, which for the most part are Sunni factions. Rather than 
confronting the American military directly, the Pasdaran has pragmatically elected to empower Shi’a 
Arabs in Iraq. In doing so, Iranian elements are focusing upon a post-occupation scenario where its 
history of support will surely garner substantial political dividends. Its history of involvement in 
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bosnia, and work with dissident groups in Iraq reveals the Pasdaran is adept at 
working through proxies in order to occasion regional goals. Washington’s blanket labeling of the 
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Pasdaran is an overt signal to its Sunni partners that American politicos are committed to confronting the 
regional projection of Iranian influence. 
Earlier in this paper a salient similarity was explored with the historic conduct of the CIA and 
Iran’s Pasdaran. In the past and post 9/11, Washington has reserved for itself the right to preempt 
perceived threats. On the basis of this rationale, Washington has legitimized its support of rebel 
elements that attack regimes it has deemed to be unacceptable. However, for essentially the same 
regional conduct the Pasdaran earned for itself a terrorist label and for Iran a role in President Bush’s 
infamous “axis of evil.” There is no question that the Pasdaran has trained and provided arms to regional 
elements such as Hezbollah and militant Shi’a groups in Iraq. However, is this different than the Reagan 
Administration’s support of the brutal military in El Salvador or the Contra Rebels in Nicaragua? In the 
course of comparing the killers of non-combatants to America’s founding fathers President Reagan 
stated, “I am Contra too.” Reagan’s conduct, although in the interest of freedom, national security, and 
national interests in the arena of anti-communism is clearly analogous to Iran’s regional conduct. In 
essence, an accomplice to the deaths of thousands of South American non-combatants, has Washington 
too not earned itself the “sponsor of terrorism” label as well? 
Ironically, Tehran’s willingness to embrace U.S. backed regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq has in 
no way altered the current U.S. presidential administration’s proclivity to vilify Iran and designate the 
Pasdaran as a terrorist organization. Despite Washington’s benevolence and continued endeavors to 
contain Iran, Tehran has still managed to establish cozy relations with its neighboring nascent regimes. 
Washington’s terrorist label is clearly an attempt to posit the Pasdaran is analogous to al Qaeda; 
however such a notion clearly lacks any modicum of intellectual lucidity. Additionally, such rationale 
would earn the United States the same designation several times over. Both callow and simplistic, this 
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worldview reflects no true understanding of global realities and threatens to unite fractious regional 
elements against the current American military presence in the Middle East. Washington’s labeling of 
the Pasdaran clearly threatens to push militant elements of Iraq and the Pasdaran closer together which 
would guarantee more violent attacks against American troops.  
 
Closing Statement 
This paper is certainly not an indictment of America and goes well beyond the scope of political 
diatribe in that it proffers political solutions supported by a growing amount of specialists in the foreign 
policy establishment. It is additionally not uncommon for a policy piece to focus criticism upon political 
leadership, past and present, as well as the forces that govern their decision-making. Failed policies, such 
as the CIA engineered 1953 coup, were discussed in depth as they are completely relevant to the current 
state of affairs between Tehran and Washington today. Many who support the notion of regime change in 
Iran are completely unaware that Iran was in fact a budding democracy at one point in history. It is 
undeniable that Washington’s intervention in Iran eliminated democracy and nurtured a dictatorship 
which later occasioned the rigid theocratic government that exists today. Sadly, almost an unknown in 
modern political circles, Mohammed Mossadegh is a colossal figure in the realm of democracy. 
However, Mossadegh was fated with the temerity to assert that his country’s natural resources were the 
sovereign property of the Iranian people at a time when certain global powers felt otherwise. The 1953 
coup not only settled a battle over natural resources, it ended the Iranian people’s fight to win their 
independence and craft their own foreign policy.  
This piece has been authored at a time when the Bush Administration is aggressively prosecuting 
its notion of “democracy promotion” in the Middle East, calling for “regime change” to wrest political 
power from the hands of the “un-elected few”. However this comes as a hard sell to objective political 
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observers and Iranians who are aware that Washington’s past intervention in Iran crushed its nascent 
democracy with dictatorial consequences. With history as a guide, it is evident there must a long-term 
strategy employed by the United States, in concert with other state actors, which diplomatically 
encourages Iran to evolve. It has become increasingly obvious that sanctions, containment strategies, and 
threats have only empowered Iranian radicals and undermined diplomacy. By encouraging Iran to focus 
upon mutual interests, Washington could certainly lessen Iran’s focus upon nuclear enrichment for 
military applications and moderate its leadership’s stance towards the state of Israel.   
Certainly misperception has played a role with Iran’s complex political culture being among the 
leading causes. As indicated in the first chapter of this paper, Iran is a complex challenge Washington 
must first face by first learning and questioning. With many strategic interests in common, Washington 
currently has the opportunity to pragmatically re-conceive its relationship with Tehran. Washington is 
also no stranger to the notion of taking the lead to pursue rapprochement with its previous foes. The 
situation with Iran calls for a similar strategy employed by President Nixon resulting in the Shanghai 
Communiqué. As it was with China in 1972, so is it in the interest of the global community for the 
United States and Iran to work towards the normalization of their relations for the purposes of 
prosecuting a successful campaign against modern issues such as the war on drugs and transnational 
terrorism. The subsequent expansion of cultural and economical relations would arguably lead to 
compromise on the nuclear issue as well. It is evident this paper argues for nothing more than what has 
yielded ample success for American statesmen in the past.  
 
“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” 
Sun Tzu163 
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